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In sharp contrast with the buoyant economic dynamism observed in most other areas of 
the world, slow growth and persistently high unemployment have been characterizing the 
European Union (EU) economy for a number of years. This report investigates some of the 
possible causes of this poor macroeconomic performance, analyzing in depth the hypotheses 
of technological backwardness and of inappropriate economic policies, as major 
determinants of potential growth. It then proposes some contrasted scenarios for economic 
and social policies in the EU and explores, with the help of the INGENUE, overlapping-
generations, general-equilibrium model of the world economy, some of the possible long-term 
evolutions of economic growth and other macroeconomic indicators for various scenarios. In 
particular, we look at the aggregate economic consequences over the next decades of various 
ways in which the combination of policies being implemented and the recent enlargement of 
the European Union may affect the growth potential of the area. More specifically, among the 
many possible changes that may be forthcoming with this new EU enlargement, we simulate 
the changes in the time-path of macroeconomic variables resulting from the achievement of 
the “ Lisbon strategy” objective of higher employment rates in the EU, from faster 
technological convergence of Eastern European economies towards Western European levels 
of total factor productivity (TFP), and from larger migration flows from Eastern European 
new members to the EU-15 countries. Although the consequences may in some cases be quite 
large for the enlarged EU economy, the induced effects on the rest of the world are, in all 
cases, relatively small, due to the small weight of Eastern Europe in the world economy and 
population. International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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Is Europe in decline? Over the recent years, the macroeconomic performance of the 
European Union has been conspicuously weak, with low growth and high unemployment, 
especially when compared to the rest of the world. While some of this poor showing may be 
attributable to cyclical factors, there is clearly a more profound, structural nature of the 
European lack of economic dynamism. But then what are the major causes of this “structural 
slump” (Phelps, 1994)? There seems to be a widely shared consensus on the idea that 
potential growth is low in Europe, but the reasons why this is so, hence the possible remedies 
for the European economic disease, are not unanimously agreed upon. The combined 
hypotheses of technological lag compared to the leading, US economy, of some assumed 
negative effects of demographic evolutions  – population ageing  –, and of relatively low 
employment rates in Europe, are often cited; indeed, they constitute the common analytical 
background of the so-called “Lisbon strategy”, adopted by the European Council at the 
Lisbon Summit in the Spring of 2000, and of many reports published in recent years on the 
EU economy or on its national components
2. 
Whatever the true determinants of potential growth, the stakes of this debate are 
paramount: for the setting of macroeconomic policies, i.e. the single monetary policy of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the aggregate of individual fiscal policies of the member 
states, the assumed value of the potential growth rate is a major ingredient; if, as is currently 
the case in Europe, it is assumed to be low and mostly independent from the macroeconomic 
policy mix, then the constraints imposed on the latter will be quite strict, resulting in overly 
restrictive orientations. 
However, the hypothesis behind the setting of ambitious objectives for growth and 
employment rates is clearly that policies matter, at least some of them. But which ones? Will 
the completion of the European Single market and of monetary union in the Euro zone boost 
potential growth in Europe, as expected? And what may be the effects of the enlargement of 
the EU to Central and Eastern European countries? 
This Report proposes an analysis of some major determinants of potential growth in the 
EU and an exploration of some scenarios for the future evolutions of macroeconomic 
conditions in the EU after the 2004 enlargement to ten new members, most of which from 
Central and Eastern Europe. The first section is devoted to the analysis of the role of 
innovation and the diffusion of information and communication technologies (ICT) in the 
determination of potential growth in Europe. The second section analyzes the possible role of 
                                                 
2 See, for instance, Sapir et al, 2003, Kok et al., 2004, Camdessus et al., 2004. 
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institutions and economic policies in setting overall economic performance. It also presents a 
number of results of an empirical study of determinants of potential growth in the EU and 
describes some broad policy scenarios for the near future. In the third section, a new version 
of the INGENUE model, an overlapping-generations, general-equilibrium model of the world 
economy, is used to simulate the long-run consequences on major macroeconomic aggregates 
of some simple scenarios regarding the convergence process of Eastern Europe after 
enlargement. Finally, Section 4 offers some conclusions. It can also be viewed as an executive 
summary of the Report. International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
OFCE  7
Section 1 . ICT and European growth  
One of the most striking features of the nineties is the dismal performance of the 
European Union (EU-15) compare to that of the United States (US). Since the mid 1990s, in 
the EU-15, not only the average growth rates of real GDP has fallen behind the US ones but 
also the growth rates of labor productivity and total factor productivity.  While a key 
ingredient, productivity growth explains only a part of country differences in per capita 
income but it remains as a disturbing stylized fact that, since 1995, productivity growth has 
indeed accelerated in the US while it has correspondingly decelerated in the EU-15. 
Compared with the first half of the 1990s, the contribution of labor to EU-15 GDP growth has 
significantly increased in the second half but these gains have been offset by a reduction in 
the contribution of labor productivity. The U S has benefited from both sources of growth, 
enjoying a higher contribution of labor allied to an acceleration of labor productivity. And the 
latest data covering the first years of the 21st century support a continuation of this picture of 
the 1990s. 
According to the most recent data jointly compiled by the Conference Board and the 
Groningen Growth and Development Centre, the figures are self-explanatory (McGuckin and 
van Ark (2004)). US productivity (as measured by output per hour) grew on average by 1 % 
per year during the first half of the 1990s, then accelerating to a 1.9 % annual average growth 
rate during the second half. And the first recession of the American New Economy did not 
even seriously derail this performance, since US productivity also grow on average by 1.9 % 
per year during 2001-2003 (0.4 % in 2001, 2.7 % in 2002 and 2.6 % in 2003). Meanwhile, 
Europe has g one in the opposite direction. During 1990-1995, EU-15 annual average 2.5 % 
productivity growth was substantially higher than US productivity, but then lost some ground 
to a 1.6 % average annual rate of growth during 1995-2000, and further again during 2001-
2003 to a meager 0.9 % average annual rate of growth (0.9 % in 2001, 0.9 % in 2002 and 
0.8 % in 2003). Surely, there is a wide variation across the EU-15 in productivity performance, 
both in terms of growth rate as well as levels (see table 1)
3. However, nearly all countries 
show a recent erosion of their productivity level relative to the US. 
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Table 1. Average Annual Growth Rates of Real GDP, Total Hours and Labor Productivity 

























Austria  2.3  2.0  2.8  0.9  0.6  0.3  -0.5  0.1  1.7  1.8  3.2  0.8 
Belgium  1.9  1.6  2.7  0.7  -0.4  -0.7  0.0  1.4  2.3  2.3  2.8  -0.7 
Denmark  2.0  2.0  2.7  1.5  0.1  -0.4  1.1  0.0  1.9  2.4  1.6  1.5 
Finland  3.1  -0.7  4.8  1.1  0.1  -3.4  1.9  -0.2  3.0  2.8  2.9  1.4 
France  2.3  1.1  2.7  1.4  -0.6  -0.4  1.4  -0.2  2.9  1.4  1.3  1.7 
Germany  2.2  2.0  1.8  0.4  -0.3  -1.9  -0.3  -0.9  2.5  4.0  2.2  1.3 
Greece  1.6  1.2  3.4  4.0  0.6  0.7  0.6  -0.2  1.0  0.6  2.8  4.2 
Ireland  3.6  4.7  9.8  4.7  -0.4  1.1  3.9  1.4  4.1  3.6  5.7  3.2 
Italy  2.2  1.3  1.9  1.1  0.3  -1.0  1.0  1.2  2.0  2.3  1.0  -0.1 
Netherlands  2.2  2.1  3.7  0.7  0.2  0.7  3.1  0.4  1.9  1.4  0.6  0.3 
Portugal  3.2  1.7  3.9  1.0  1.4  -1.8  0.8  1.0  1.7  3.5  3.1  0.1 
Spain  2.9  1.5  3.8  2.2  -0.1  -0.7  4.2  2.6  3.0  2.3  -0.3  -0.4 
Sweden  2.0  0.7  3.3  1.5  09  -1.3  1.0  -0.5  1.1  2.0  2.2  2.0 
UK  2.6  1.8  2.9  1.7  0.5  -1.2  1.0  0.7  2.2  3.0  1.8  1.1 
EU  2.4  1.6  2.7  1.3  0.1  -1.0  1.1  0.4  2.3  2.6  1.5  0.8 
US  3.2  2.4  4.0  1.3  1.7  1.2  2.0  -0.4  1.4  1.1  2.0  1.7 
Japan  4.0  1.4  1.4  -0.7  1.0  -0.4  -0.9  -0.9  3.0  1.8  2.3  0.2 
Note: Germany 1980-1990 refers to West Germany; EU 1980-1990 excludes Eastern Lander of Germany; the 
EU-15 here excludes Luxembourg.  Data may be slightly different from the aggregate ones mentioned in the text 
because they are a bit less recent. 
Sources: GGDC/The Conference Board, Total Economy Database (June 2003) – O’Mahony – van Ark (2003) 
 
This dramatic change in relative performance signals an arrest in the process of 
convergence between the EU-15 and the US  that began after World War II.  And this 
divergence clearly goes against the ambitions of the Lisbon Strategy adopted by the EU-15 in 
March 2000,
4 in response to the ICT-linked acceleration of US productivity growth and 
supposed to make Europe the most competitive economy in the world by 2010. Five years 
later, huge progresses remain to be made and the diagnosis of Europe’s problems does not 
invite to be overly optimistic as for a quick solution.  Indeed, the slower diffusion of ICT and 
their lower contribution to GDP and productivity growth are only a limited and not so 
convincing part of the problem. It is necessary to turn to a different set of explanations to 
better understand why Europe is falling behind. These explanations focus on issues which are 
not directly related to the effects of the ICT revolution, and so are much more difficult to 
tackle with (for instance all the supposed rigidities in the product and labor markets...).  
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The aim of this Section is certainly not to pinpoint these structural explanations, but only 
to shed light on the ICT aspect of the question.  ICT may not play in Europe a role as 
important as in the US, but it is quite instructive to fully understand in what way.  
The link between ICT and growth has been first largely debated in the US and widely 
documented for the US
5. International comparisons came a bit later on and first produced 
comparable estimates of ICT contributions to GDP and productivity growth derived from a 
growth accounting framework
6.  
As the debate was raging, a complementary approach at the industry level of detail has 
been gaining some credit to locate where the productivity gains were exactly coming from
7. 
This industry perspective has hence developed a precise and useful ICT taxonomy, based on 
whether industries were producers or users of ICT (and within the latter their intensity of use).  
A clearer and more comprehensive picture of the European case, compared to the US, h as 
then only recently emerged. A recent report commissioned by and prepared for the Enterprise 
Directorate-General of the European Commission is of particular interest (O’Mahony and van 
Ark, 2003). The OECD (2004), the European Commission (Denis, McMorrow and Röger, 
2004) and Jorgenson (2004b) also provide interesting and updated results. 
This Section of the Report is constructed as follows. The first part will review the main 
results derived from the growth accounting framework. This analysis provides an idea of the 
magnitude of the direct effects on GDP and labor productivity growth of ICT (through the 
contribution of capital deepening and total factor productivity (TFP)). The second part will 
outline the main points of the industry perspective, summarizing t he findings of the 
O’Mahony – van Ark study. The third part will give some conclusions. 
1. Lessons from the growth accounting framework 
Growth accounting results presented in this section are taken from Jorgenson (2004b). 
This work presents international comparisons of economic growth among  the G7 nations 
(Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US) using internationally harmonized 
data for the period 1980-2001.  The methodology used is the usual growth accounting 
framework first introduced by  Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) and regularly updated by 
Jorgenson and his associates (see Jorgenson, 2004a for the latest version). In this framework, 
                                                 
5 Gordon (1999, 2000, 2003), Jorgenson (2001), Jorgenson and Stiroh (1999, 2000), Jorgenson, Ho and 
Stiroh (2002), McGuckin and Stiroh (1998), Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002), Sichel (1997, 1999), Stiroh (1998, 
1999). 
6 Schreyer (2000), European Commission (2000), Colecchia and Schreyer (2001), Daveri (2001), OECD 
(2000, 2001). These estimates were preliminary findings as the data and the underlying assumptions have been 
later revised and completed. 
7 Van Ark (2001), Pilat and Lee (2001), McGuckin and van Ark (2001), Van Ark, Inklaar and McGuckin 
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Total Factor Productivity (TFP, thereafter) is computed as a residual that measures growth of 
output not explained by growth of inputs
8: 
tL,ttKi,ttKn,tt lnTFPlnYlnLlnKilnKn D=D-wD-wD-wD         (1) 
where Y is real output, L is labor, Ki and Kn denote, respectively, ICT and non-ICT capital. 
The w's represent average input shares in nominal income for the subscripted variables. The 
method assumes perfect markets and constant returns to scale so that the share of total capital 
is one minus labor's share. Capital inputs are measured as services flows and the share of each 
type in the value of capital is based on its user cost. 
Rearranging equation (1) enables us to present results in terms of growth in labor 
productivity, defined as  ttt yYH =  where Ht is the number of hours worked and  ttt kKH =  
is the ratio of capital services to hours work worked: 
( ) tK,ttL,tttt lnylnklnLlnHlnTFP D=wD+wD-D+D         (2) 
Equation (2) gives the familiar allocation of labor productivity growth among three 
factors. The first is capital deepening, that is the growth in capital services per hour worked. 
Capital deepening makes workers more productive by providing more capital for each hour of 
work. The second term is the improvement of labor quality, defined as the difference between 
growth rates of labor input and hours worked. The third factor is TFP growth. 
The first striking result of this study is the wide gap in output per capita existing between 
the US and European countries throughout the period 1980-2001 (see Table 2). Interestingly, 
no such a gap exists for TFP levels. The US TFP languished below the levels of France and 
Italy. This result suggests that technology does not play a major role in explaining output per 
capita differences. The culprit has to be found in the very low levels of input per capita, which 
includes  here labor and capital inputs. The US was the leader among the G7 in input per 
capita over the period 1980-2001. France and Italy started at the bottom of the ranking and 
remained there throughout the period. Low employment levels and weak investment seem to 
be the prevailing causes of poor European economic growth performance. TFP gains allowed 
by ICT diffusion are just a small part of the story. One has to put the focus on the role of 
economic policy and institutional environment to understand properly the huge performance 
gap existing between the US and European economies
9. 
 
                                                 
8 See Hulten (2000) for a careful exposition. 
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Table 2. Levels of Output and Input Per Capita and Total Factor Productivity  
(US = 100 in 2000, Canada data begins in 1981) 
Year  US  Canada  UK  France  Germany  Italy  Japan 
Output Per Capita 
1980   63.9   67.6   45.0   45.9   49.3   45.9   39.6  
1989   79.7   78.8   56.5   54.1   58.6   57.3   56.0  
1995   85.6   79.6   61.4   57.0   65.0   62.1   64.0  
2001   100.3   91.9   71.3   64.0   69.2   68.8   70.6  
Input Per Capita 
1980   70.5   64.2   50.2   46.5   61.0   43.1   57.7  
1989   83.9   74.4   61.2   53.3   71.1   55.5   72.0  
1995   88.8   75.2   67.0   57.0   73.7   58.8   77.8  
2001   100.8   83.7   73.6   61.7   79.0   67.2   80.9  
Total Factor Productivity 
1980   90.6   105.4   89.5   98.6   80.8   106.6   68.7  
1989   94.9   105.9   92.3   101.5   82.4   103.2   77.7  
1995   96.4   105.9   91.7   99.9   88.1   105.6   82.3  
2001   99.5   109.7   96.9   103.6   87.6   102.5   87.2  
Source: Jorgenson (2004b), Table 1. 
This argument seems to be reinforced by the analysis of the sources of output growth. 
Table 3 summarizes the contribution of labor, capital and TFP to output growth and table 4 
the contribution of labor quality, capital deepening and TFP to labor productivity growth. 
Capital input is divided between ICT and non-ICT.  
In order to make some comparisons of results (and to be sure these results are of the same 
magnitude, and if not, where the differences are), the estimates of Timmer, Ypma and van 
Ark (2003) for the US and the EU-15 as a whole have been added to Jorgenson’s ones.  
Except for Japan, TFP played a minor role as a source of growth for the G7 countries. 
Even in the US, TFP accounted for less than 14 percent of growth on the whole period. The 
same order of values prevails for European countries. On the contrary, the contribution of 
capital alone widely exceeds that of TFP for most countries and most time periods. Note that 
the contribution of non-ICT capital generally predominates over ICT capital.  
But the most striking difference between European economies and the US is the 
contribution of labor. This input contribution is even negative for France between 1980 and 
1989 and for the UK and Germany for the period 1989-1995.  
About 40 % of US GDP growth and 30 % of the EU-15 growth during 1995-2001 hold to 
ICT. And ICT explains half of the acceleration of US GDP growth and nearly 40 % of the 
acceleration of the EU-15 growth between the first half and the second half of the 1990s.  
ICT may be a powerful engine of growth, but labor and non-ICT capital are also 
important sources of growth for both countries.  International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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Table 3. Sources of Output Growth  
(Percentage Point Contributions. Canada data begins in 1981) 
Year   US (1)  US (2)  Canada  UK  France  Germany  Italy  EU-15  Japan 
Output 
1980-1989  3.19  3.34  3.10  2.69  2.38  1.99  2.51  2.38  4.42 
1989-1995  2.42  2.36  1.39  1.62  1.30  2.34  1.52  1.58  2.56 
1995-2001  3.52  3.58  3.34  2.74  2.34  1.18  1.90  2.42  1.85 
Labour 
1980-1989  1.22  1.35  1.33  0.56  -0.06  0.32  0.32  0.05  1.20 
1989-1995  0.86  0.98  0.62  -0.24  0.44  -0.09  0.03  -0.59  0.15 
1995-2001  1.15  1.12  1.08  0.88  0.59  0.17  0.93  0.69  -0.22 
ICT-Capital (1) 
1980-1989  0.59  0.46  0.39  0.24  0.18  0.19  0.24  0.35  0.43 
1989-1995  0.46  0.47  0.49  0.27  0.19  0.26  0.26  0.27  0.31 
1995-2001  0.82  0.93  0.86  0.76  0.42  0.46  0.49  0.46  0.75 
Non-ICT-Capital 
1980-1989  0.62  1.00  1.32  1.56  1.94  1.25  2.31  0.86  1.42 
1989-1995  0.49  0.68  0.27  1.69  0.93  1.05  0.86  0.77  1.16 
1995-2001  0.75  1.11  0.81  0.18  0.73  0.65  0.98  0.81  0.35 
Total Factor Productivity from ICT production (2) 
1980-1989    0.22  0.14  0.23  0.29  0.28  0.32    0.23 
1989-1995  0.24  0.25  0.14  0.32  0.29  0.43  0.38  0.15  0.29 
1995-2001  0.44  0.41  0.17  0.82  0.56  0.65  0.68  0.27  0.57 
Total Factor Productivity from non-ICT production 
1980-1989    0.31  -0.08  0.11  0.03  -0.05  -0.68    1.14 
1989-1995  0.37  -0.02  -0.14  -0.43  -0.55  0.69  -0.01  0.99  0.65 
1995-2001  0.36  0.01  0.41  0.09  0.04  -0.75  -1.17  0.19  0.41 
Total ICT contribution to output growth (1)+(2) 
1980-1989    0.68  0.53  0.47  0.47  0.47  0.56    0.66 
1989-1995  0.70  0.72  0.63  0.59  0.48  0.69  0.64  0.42  0.60 
1995-2001  1.26  1.34  1.03  1.58  0.98  1.11  1.17  0.73  1.32 
Sources: Jorgenson (2004b), from Table 15, for US (2) and individual G7 countries; Timmer, Ypma and 
van Ark (2003), from tables 6 and 13, for US (1) and the EU-15. 
 
As for labor productivity growth, the diagnosis is quite different because labor 
productivity growth has accelerated in the US but decelerated in the EU-15.  ICT contributed 
positively in both countries to labor productivity change over both periods of time.  But in the 
US case, this positive contribution has been enhanced by the increased contribution of non-
ICT capital deepening and of TFP from non-ICT production; in the EU-15 case, it has been 
erased by the sharp decline of the non-ICT capital deepening contribution and of TFP from 
non-ICT production.  
These observations call for a deeper analysis of the real determinants of productivity, too 
often reduced to the determinants of the diffusion of innovations. To tackle this issue, it is 
firstly important to examine what is really explained by technical progress on the one hand, 
and what is the role that investment has played in the determination of potential growth, on 
the other. This is the kind of investigation that needs to be extended to European economies. 
 International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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Table 4. Sources of Labor Productivity Growth  
(Percentage Point Contributions. Canada data begins in 1981) 
Year   US (1)  US (2)  Canada  UK  France  Germany  Italy  EU-15  Japan 
Output 
1980-1989  3.19  3.34  3.10  2.69  2.38  1.99  2.51  2.38  4.42 
1989-1995  2.42  2.36  1.39  1.62  1.30  2.34  1.52  1.58  2.56 
1995-2001  3.52  3.58  3.34  2.74  2.34  1.18  1.90  2.42  1.85 
Hours  
1980-1989  1.73  1.79  1.87  0.82  -0.66  0.11  0.15  0.10  0.56 
1989-1995  1.23  1.02  0.20  -1.17  -0.41  -0.71  -0.57  -0.85  -067 
1995-2001  1.67  1.53  1.93  1.03  0.91  -0.11  0.99  1.05  -0.73 
Labor productivity 
1980-1989  1.46  1.55  1.23  1.87  3.04  1.88  2.36  2.28  3.86 
1989-1995  1.19  1.34  1.19  2.79  1.71  3.05  2.09  2.43  3.23 
1995-2001  1.85  2.05  1.41  1.71  1.43  1.29  0.92  1.37  2.58 
ICT Capital deepening (1) 
1980-1989  0.52  0.41  0.35  0.22  0.19  0.19  0.23  0.34  0.42 
1989-1995  0.40  0.43  0.48  0.29  0.20  0.28  0.28  0.29  0.33 
1995-2001  0.72  0.85  0.79  0.71  0.39  0.46  0.45  0.42  0.78 
Non-ICT Capital deepening 
1980-1989  0.19  0.31  0.42  1.20  2.29  1.20  2.25  0.82  1.20 
1989-1995  0.19  0.32  0.16  2.11  1.15  1.33  1.06  1.01  1.42 
1995-2001  0.32  0.55  -0.14  -0.21  0.25  0.70  0.61  0.48  0.61 
Labor quality 
1980-1989  n.d  0.30  0.40  0.12  0.24  0.26  0.23  n.d  0.87 
1989-1995  n.d  0.36  0.55  0.49  0.61  0.33  0.38  n.d  0.54 
1995-2001  n.d  0.23  0.18  0.30  0.19  0.23  0.35  n.d  0.21 
Total Factor Productivity from ICT production (2) 
1980-1989    0.22  0.14  0.23  0.29  0.28  0.32    0.23 
1989-1995  0.24  0.25  0.14  0.32  0.29  0.43  0.38  0.15  0.29 
1995-2001  0.44  0.41  0.17  0.82  0.56  0.65  0.68  0.27  0.57 
Total Factor Productivity from non-ICT production 
1980-1989    0.31  -0.08  0.11  0.03  -0.05  -0.68    1.14 
1989-1995  0.37  -0.02  -0.14  -0.43  -0.55  0.69  -0.01  0.99  0.65 
1995-2001  0.36  0.01  0.41  0.09  0.04  -0.75  -1.17  0.19  0.41 
Total ICT contribution to labor productivity growth (1)+(2) 
1980-1989    0.63  0.49  0.45  0.48  0.47  0.55    0.65 
1989-1995  0.64  0.68  0.62  0.61  0.49  0.71  0.66  0.44  0.62 
1995-2001  1.16  1.26  0.96  1.53  0.95  1.11  1.13  0.69  1.35 
Sources: Jorgenson (2004b), from Table 16, for US (2) and individual G7 countries; Timmer, Ypma and 
van Ark (2003), from tables 7 and 13, for US (1) and the EU-15. 
 
In a recent work ( Musso,  2005), we have intended to replicate growth accounting 
analyses, which are at the core of the main recent studies that explain the contribution of ICT 
to the evolution of productivity and economic growth in the US. This exercise has permitted 
to measure the effect on the measurement of TFP of the hypothesis regarding estimates of 
capital inputs.  
Two important preliminary results have been obtained: International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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1- The measurement of TFP is very sensitive to the hypothesis of a constant lifespan of 
equipment. A relatively modest increase in the physical depreciation rate of capital from the 
beginning of the 1970s would be sufficient to annihilate the TFP slowdown observed in the 
US till the end of the 1990s. The study of the sensitivity of productivity measurement and the 
results of a vintage capital model of obsolescence calibrated on the US data (Musso, 2004b) 
suggest that the TFP slowdown observed in the US during the 1970-1995 period could 
essentially be due to measurement errors mainly induced by the acceleration of capital 
obsolescence. Then one may admit that, far from slowing down, the rhythm of technical 
progress and the rhythm of diffusion of innovations have rather increased since the beginning 
of the 1970s, partly thanks to the spectacular performances exhibited by the semiconductor 
industry.  This result is interesting because the choice of a constant rate of physical 
depreciation has been widely criticized (see for instance Feldstein and Foot, 1971; Harper, 
1982; and Feldstein and Rothschild, 1974). Many studies have insisted on the endogenous 
property of the capital lifespan. From a theoretical point of view, this question is mostly 
handled by means of vintage capital models
10. These studies insist on the role played by the 
rhythm of technical progress (obsolescence), the evolution of the interest rate, and fiscal 
policies. From an empirical viewpoint, several case studies have confirmed these institutions
11. 
Although these  results can hardly be generalized and therefore cannot offer alternative 
measures of the global stock of capital, their conclusions suggest that the use of a constant 
rate of physical decay introduces a considerable bias in the estimation of the evolution of the 
stock of capital. 
2- The use of hedonic prices indexes is aimed at better handling the evolution of the 
quality of different vintages of capital goods. This also significantly modifies the results of 
measurement of growth sources. The use of price indexes produced by Cummins and Violante 
(2002)
12 based on the seminal work of  Gordon (1990) limits the contribution of TFP to 
potential growth, and conversely accentuate the role of capital accumulation.  As a 
consequence, investment seems to play an essential role in the process of determination of 
potential growth through diverse channels.  Technical progress does matter.  But long-run 
growth depends more on the way technical progress is sustained by investment. Thus, all 
things being equal, an acceleration of investment is likely to have a significant positive impact 
on potential growth by favoring the accumulation of capital and employment.  But this 
acceleration of investment may increase the obsolescence of equipment at the same time, 
subsequently impacting negatively the increase of available capital stock. More generally, the 
net impact of investment on potential growth will be strongly dependent on macroeconomic 
                                                 
10 Feldstein and Rothschild (1974), Gilchrist and Williams (2000), Lindh (2000), Whelan (2002) and Musso 
(2004a). 
11 Feldstein and Foot (1971), Cockburn and Murray (1992) and Oliner (1994, 1996). 
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factors such as the level of economic activity and employment, the cost of capital and the age 
structure of equipment.  
As a summary, when price indexes are adjusted to better take into account the evolution 
of the quality of equipment, the contribution of TFP to potential growth proves to be 
considerably overestimated by traditional  analyses of growth accounting. Then, investment 
actually is an essential determinant of the long-term potential growth. These results and the 
subsequent questions leads to extend the investigation to European countries in order to take 
into deeper consideration the determinants of productivity and potential growth, far beyond a 
simple study of the diffusion of innovations. 
2. The useful ICT taxonomy 
Although it is still too early to answer definitively the question of a structural break in US 
output and productivity growth since 1995, many observers now believe that the US has 
experienced such a structural break leading to somewhat faster productivity growth and so 
faster potential growth
13.  
As for the EU-15 case, in contrast to the US position, one has to keep in mind that there is 
yet less evidence that its own productivity slowdown is also of structural nature. Firstly and 
noteworthy, the productivity growth rates experienced in recent years in the EU-15 are no less 
than those in the US in the 1980s. Secondly, the EU-15 may simply suffer from a lag of three 
to five years in the diffusion of ICT compare to the US, which means there are more benefits 
to come in the next decade. The issue for the EU-15 is whether these resources can indeed be 
mobilized in a productive way. The industry perspective both helps put this issue and the EU-
15 laggard status into perspective but also magnifies some of its structural flaws. 
The industry perspective has first been used to pinpoint in which specific industries the 
US was achieving superior performance in order to clarify whether the productivity 
acceleration was just confined to a few sectors or was more generally widespread. While the 
first results based on a smaller and imperfect set of data were tilted towards the confined 
version, a consensus has progressively emerged supporting the widespread version.  ICT 
producing sectors do exhibit very high labor and total factor productivity growth rates, but a 
small number of service sectors also make important contributions (wholesale and retail trade, 
financial securities). The industry perspective helps to know whether EU-15 productivity 
growth rates have improved in those industries where the US has also shown acceleration, 
with the poor EU-15 performance attributable elsewhere. 
                                                 
13 Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2004) have even revised upwards their projection.  During the next decade, 
private sector productivity will grow at a rate of 2.6 % per year on average, a significant increase from their 2002 
projection of 2.2 %.   International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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For the purpose of the DG-European Commission report (O’Mahony and van Ark, 2003), 
a unique database, the Industry Labor Productivity Database, has been developed for all 15 
EU member states and the US at the level of 56 industries for 1979 to 2001. The above-
mentioned ICT taxonomy divides these 56 industries into ICT producing, ICT using and non-
ICT, with the latter two dependent on intensity of use of ICT equipment, and distinguishing 
manufacturing and services industries. These data reveal without any surprise that the US has 
higher value added shares in both ICT producing sectors (7.7 % for the US compare to 6.2 % 
for the EU-15) and ICT using services (29.5 % compare t o 23.3 %).  This greater 
concentration in high technology industries, which are industries that are more likely to use 
highly skilled labor, clearly contributes to the US productivity advantage over the EU. These 
highly disaggregated data are not available for capital services and thus only allow for labor 
productivity computations and comparisons. They confirm that (see Table 5): 
-  The US  labor productivity acceleration is widespread and concerns 29 of the 56 
industries.  Using employment shares as weights, one can compute the contribution of 
each industry to the aggregate. This shows that a limited number of manufacturing 
industries in the ICT producing sectors (computers, electronic valves and 
communication equipment), and three major service industries (wholesale, retail and 
auxiliary financial services) account for the lion’s share of the US improvement. 
-  Compared the EU-15 score, the US score becomes even more impressive. Indeed, in 
contrast, decelerating labor productivity growth is the norm in the EU-15: 45 of the 56 
industries exhibit lower productivity gains in 1995-2001 than in 1990-1995. 
-  One positive point is that in ICT producing manufacturing, in both the US and the EU-
15, labor productivity growth rates are significantly higher than all other sectors and 
show a similar pattern of accelerated growth in the late 1990s (although at a much 
higher rate in the US). 
-  Another one is that the ICT producing services industries is the only ICT group for 
which the EU-15 shows an acceleration from the mid 1990s, whereas the US shows a 
deceleration. 
-  The main differences between the US and the EU-15 occur in ICT using services 
industries and non-ICT industries. In the case of ICT using services industries, there is 
a sharp acceleration of labor productivity growth in the US not matched in the EU-15. 
In fact, the deceleration of EU-15 productivity growth is largely due to non-ICT 
industries, in particular service industries. 
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Table 5. Average Annual Labor Productivity Growth of ICT Producing, ICT Using and 
Non-ICT Industries in the EU-15 and the US 
1979-1990  1990-1995  1995-2001  Value added 
share, 1999 
 
EU  US  EU  US  EU  US  EU  US 












4.4  2.4  4.8  2.4  5.9  1.8  4.9  5.0 
ICT using 
industries 
2.2  1.2  2.0  1.2  1.9  4.7  30.2  34.6 
ICT using 
manufacturing 
2.4  0.5  2.4  0.6  1.8  0.4  6.9  5.1 
ICT using 
services 
2.1  1.4  1.8  1.6  1.8  5.3  23.3  29.5 
Non-ICT 
industries 
1.8  0.5  2.1  0.3  1.0  -0.2  63.6  57.7 
Non-ICT 
manufacturing 
3.0  2.1  3.6  2.7  1.6  0.3  13.6  10.6 
Non-ICT 
services 
0.6  -0.2  1.2  -0.5  0.5  -0.3  38.3  36.5 
Non-ICT 
other 
3.4  2.0  3.2  1.2  2.1  0.7  11.7  10.6 
Note: ideally, the year 2001 should be distinguished from the whole period in order to have a better picture 
of the true acceleration of labor productivity growth between 1990-1995 and 1995-2000. 
Sources: GGDC/The Conference Board, Total Economy Database (June 2003) – O’Mahony – van Ark 
(2003) 
 
One can also find in the European Commission report a growth accounting analysis 
implemented for each of the major group (ICT producing, ICT using, non-ICT). It helps to 
identify the corresponding contributions of labor quality, ICT and non-ICT capital deepening 
and TFP to labor productivity growth. Because of data availability, this analysis has been 
carried out only up to 2000 and only for the United States, France, Germany, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom. The most important results are the following (we focus on capital 
deepening and TFP): 
-  The main contribution to labor productivity growth in ICT producing industries comes 
from TFP growth, and it has been rising over time in both regions. The contribution of 
ICT capital deepening has also increased across the two time periods (first half and 
second half of the 1990s) but by more in the US than in the EU-4. And while non-ICT 
capital deepening contribution has also increased in the US, it has not in the EU-4. 
-  The ICT using group is characterized by a proportionally higher contribution of ICT 
capital deepening than was the case for the ICT producing group. The contribution of International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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ICT capital deepening was comparable in the first half of the 1990s, but it has risen by 
more in the US than in the EU-4 during 1995-2000. A dramatic decline in the non-ICT 
capital deepening contribution to EU-4 labor productivity growth is also to be 
mentioned, while it h as fallen only marginally in the US. The TFP contribution has 
been rising over time for both countries, but the increase is sharper in the US than in 
the EU-4. 
-  In non-ICT using industries, non-ICT capital deepening is more important than ICT 
capital deepening as a source of labor productivity growth in the EU-4 (but its 
contribution has strongly decreased over time whilst the ICT capital deepening 
contribution has been rising a bit).  It is the opposite for the US (besides both 
contributions have slightly increased over time). The TFP contribution has declined in 
both countries but it remains positive in the EU-4 while it is strongly negative in the 
US
14. 
-  There is no widespread acceleration of TFP growth in the EU-4 neither in the US. In 
the EU-4 and in the US, it is largely confined to the ICT producing manufacturing 
sector, communications and some industries subject to a high degree of deregulation 
(agriculture, utilities and transport). In the US, the wholesale and retail trade sectors 
also exhibit a higher TFP growth rate, which mirrors the findings in terms of labor 
productivity.  
To sum up, if capital deepening has declined in importance as a source of labor 
productivity growth in the EU-4 across time, it is largely because of traditional non-ICT 
capital.  The EU has enhanced policies which may have in turn changed the traditional 
economic channels of substitution of capital for labor. Wage moderation and pro-active labor 
markets policies in recent years may have led to substitution of labor for capital, in particular 
in traditional industries. 
3. Concluding remarks  
Contrary to the common wisdom, the changes in the determinants of growth in the EU-15 
during the 1990s may have been much more dramatic than in the US. Whereas US labor 
productivity growth accelerated through higher contributions of all sources of growth, EU-15 
labor productivity growth slow downed because of a decline in contributions from both non-
ICT capital deepening and non-ICT TFP, erasing the increased contribution from ICT-capital 
deepening and TFP growth in ICT producing industries. Moreover, pro-labor policies might 
                                                 
14 This may reflect measurement problems rather than a superior performance of the EU. International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
OFCE  19
have changed the trade-off between productivity and employment, in favor of low TFP, low 
skilled, low productive jobs. 
It is always possible to consider that both the growth accounting and the industry 
perspective results highlight a significant role for the competitive/regulatory environment in 
explaining the difference in productivity performance between the US and the EU-15. The 
main point is, the O’Mahony – van Ark report argues, that, on balance, “policies to strengthen 
product market competition are usually worthwhile, in particular in service industries, but the 
arguments in favor of intervention in labor markets are weaker”. In this perspective, the 
dismal performance of Europe seems only marginally ICT-related, so the EU catch-up should 
be inevitable but it may be slowed by  the institutional environment.  When this latter is 
supportive to innovation, growth and so on, productivity (and employment) growth follows. 
In fact,  the smaller EU Member States which are among the best performing States are 
precisely the same countries that have already undertaken deep and successful reforms well 
before the launch of the Lisbon strategy. While some larger EU Member States seem to have 
failed to recognize on time the extent of such needed reforms and are clear laggards in terms 
of labor productivity growth. Their experience would demonstrate there is nothing inherently 
wrong with the policy framework of the Lisbon strategy.  
However such conclusion is highly sensitive to the data, as revealed by the work of 
McMorrow and Röger (2001) who have developed a model allowing testing for the role of 
market rigidities.  One of their questions was “ whether Europe could have benefited 
substantially more from the ICT revolution if it had a more flexible economy in the form of 
lower capital adjustment costs and less wage rigidities”. Their conclusion was that, “ rather 
than blaming Eurosclerosis in general for the reason for Europe lagging behind US rates of 
growth, European policy makers should perhaps instead focus more narrowly on the 
determinants of the US apparent comparative advantage in the production of leading edge, 
high technology goods”. It was based on their simulations which suggested “that it is the high 
rates of TFP growth in the production of these goods, rather than the capital accumulation 
effects, which has provided the single greatest contribution to the acceleration in the US 
growth performance over the recent years”. Unfortunately, the most recent estimates do not 
suggest this anymore, which implies that policy makers should also focus on the other 
determinants of the US’ apparent comparative advantage. The sole differences in the rate of 
technical progress are no longer an adequate explanation of the growth differential between 
the two countries. 
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Section 2 . Institutions, economic policies and performance 
One way to enlarge further the debate and in fact to change of perspective is to consider 
that the key issues to be addressed might not revolve around the possibility of convergence 
towards some pre-determined equilibrium growth path. They might be about the nature of 
growth regimes in the history of our economies and their relevant stability features. As a 
matter of fact, the central stylized fact revealed by international comparisons is the diversity 
of evolution across countries that still have faced the same kind of shocks and have had access 
to the same technologies. This diversity is closely related to the nature and the profile of the 
accumulation process and economic policies. 
The different productivity trends in Europe and the US in the 1990s and the apparent 
disappearance of the productivity paradox in those years in the US
15 confirm the scenario that 
focuses on co-ordination failures.  The truly important difference between most of the 
European countries and the US is likely to be this: in the US, the rate of investment has 
remained constant and investment has always actually increased following supply shocks. At 
the same time, the stock market bubble pushed capital costs downward and allowed firms to 
carry out their desired investments. As a consequence, the rate of growth consistent with the 
price stability has risen, and correlatively the NAIRU has decreased.  
The US economy did not experience structural fluctuations to the same extent as some 
other, perhaps core EU countries (Böhm, Gaffard and Punzo, 2001, Gaffard and Punzo, 2005). 
This was mainly due to the fact that “policy has not generated bouts of severe inflation and so 
has not had to generate bouts of recession to control it” (Romer, 1999, p. 32). Conversely, the 
poor performance of productivity in Europe is the result of a reduced process of accumulation 
(also characterized by strong fluctuations) that could be due to a tight m onetary policy, and 
more generally to a wrong policy management. 
Behind these different realized accumulation processes, different co-ordination 
mechanisms have been at work, one actually sustaining this process and the other failing to do 
so. Good coordination of the process of accumulation of capital, not price flexibility, is the 
main reason of the satisfactory performance of the US, although the behavior of prices may 
have helped.  A strong wage flexibility associated with a strong increase in personal 
inequalities has not resulted in perturbations of the economic activity because a strong growth 
made possible by good co-ordination mechanisms has led to a huge creation of jobs and hence 
to a stability of wage shares. In Europe, where the restrictive policies adopted have checked 
the process of capital accumulation, strong fluctuations of the wage shares in the gross 
                                                 
15 See Section 1 of the Report. International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
OFCE  21
national products due to mistakes in economic policy may have contributed to exacerbate the 
existing distortions, instead of helping to reduce them. 
The economic transformation of Europe such as involved by technological changes, 
enlargement of EU, and competition with emerging economies (China, India) and US as well, 
requires a new deal that should really both promote growth and enhance social welfare and 
cohesion. The key issue to be addressed is not the realization of the institutional conditions 
supposed to automatically allow the choice of best technology practices and hence the 
convergence towards a predetermined optimal growth path.  We have, in fact, to look at 
growth as the result of an adaptive process that allows discovering the relevant information 
and hence capturing the potential gains associated with the development of new technologies 
and market extensions.  
The real issue is about the necessarily complex set of conditions that make the process of 
accumulation and restructuring of capital regular and hence determine the actual growth rate 
of the potential output.  This set cannot be reduced to the choice of an institutional 
arrangement presumed optimal.  Thus, contrary to the current consensus, macroeconomic 
stability, far from being regarded as a precondition of growth, regarded as a set of rules aimed 
at guaranteeing monetary stability and fiscal discipline, will result from a process that requires 
discretionary interventions. 
In this perspective, monetary policy should be aimed at promoting banking behaviors and 
structures that sustain necessary investment instead of maintaining a constraint on firms’ 
behaviors in order to maintain full price stability
16. E mployment protection, and more 
generally institutional rules that favor social cohesion, should be viewed (and amended) as a 
means for allowing the economy to deal with turbulences, and hence guaranteeing the 
effectiveness of the learning process. Competition and regulatory policies should be oriented 
in such a way as considering market imperfections as integral and necessary aspects of the 
production and the dissemination of knowledge in a market economy, i.e. as the natural 
features of an economic process driven by creative destruction. Cohesion policies should 
make it compatible to promote growth in each region or country and maintain an economic 
and political equilibrium between them. 
Of course, institutions matter. However, they have to be considered in relation to the 
adjustment process required by structural changes rather than in relation to the presumed 
performance in the long run. “Their role has to be altogether redefined, to be one of helping 
reducing the irregularity in the growth process generated by e.g. technology shocks and 
generally innovation, rather than in determining the growth trend. They do contribute to the 
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latter by accomplishing the former task. Effective institutional systems contribute to regular 
dynamic patterns, not those that just incorporate stronger incentives for growth. The reason 
is that innovation in its variety of forms is by its very nature a break up and implies a 
discontinuity: e.g. a break up in the existing production structure and markets. It brings about 
adjustment costs and specific problems of coordination between economic activities. 
Depending upon the way these new problems are dealt with, an economy’s growth is more or 
less regular and accordingly the productivity and output gains ripped out of innovation 
greater or smaller. The challenge is to render the technological and institutional evolution as 
gradual as possible. This being their appropriate role, economic policies need only go the 
same way” (Gaffard and Punzo, 2005). 
1. Growth strategy in the EU: Quo Vadis Europa?  
a. Institutions and Growth in Europe 
The link between institutions and growth is now an object of wide consent among 
economists.
17 The exploration of this theoretically rich relation has given rise, in our 
economic time, to a  new wave of comparative economics in the form of a “new-new 
institutionalism” (that in some ways resembles the “old” one of such founding fathers as Ely, 
Commons and Veblen) devoted to analytically identify and empirically document the 
complex interactions between institutions and growth (see, among many others in this fast-
growing literature, Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; and 
Rodrik et al., 2002)
 18.  
The elementary question remains: “what do we mean by ‘institutions’?”. In this respect, 
one should note that an intriguing feature of the new literature cited above is that it seems 
almost exclusively focused on developing countries, leaving aside the link between 
institutions and growth in developed economies. What is more, when i t comes to 
economically advanced countries, the role of macroeconomic policies  –and their crucial 
articulation or, better, coherence with “structural” institutions– seem to disappear in favour of 
monochromic diagnoses of harmful “rigidities”. 
Indeed, on the other theoretical end of the new “comparative growth economics” devoted 
to shed some light on recent miracles and enduring failures among emerging economies, has 
                                                 
17 One can think of the quasi-unanimous praise that welcomed the work of D. North and R. Fogel, who 
were awarded the Nobel Prize in 1993 for their analysis of the “role institutions play in economic growth”. 
18 One must certainly keep in mind that the debate is only heating at the highest level of the academic 
community and that many refutations, validations and tests of all kinds separate us from an integrated view, if it 
is ever to exist, on this issue (see, among the methodical doubters, Sachs, 2003, Glaeser et al., 2004 and, for a 
very first survey of the field and some clarifications, Rodrik, 2004). Whatever the future refinements, no one 
would seriously present growth theory today without institutional perspectives (for a state of the art panorama, 
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stand alone, until recently, a “comparative structuralism” aimed at fundamentally relating 
economic performance of developed nations to their  labor market structures (for classic 
contributions, see Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991 and Calmfors and Driffill, 1988 ; for 
counter-argumentation, see Fitoussi and Passet, 2000; Fitoussi, 2002; and Freeman, 2000). 
The recent “comparative capitalism” or “varieties of capitalism” literature, focused on the key 
issues of co-ordination (and the subsequent distinction between “liberal market economies” 
and “coordinated market economies”) and “institutional complementarities”, is a fertile new 
ground for a more accurate perception of dynamic institutional interactions and their 
economic outcomes (see Hall and Soskice, 2001 and, most recently, Gingerich and Hall, 
2004).  
When considering the classical and rather broad definition of “institutions” given by 
Douglas North (1994):  “the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction 
[...] made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of 
behavior, conventions, and self imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement 
characteristics. Together [defining] the incentive structure of societies and specifically 
economies” (see North, 1990 for the original formulation), it actually appears problematic, to 
say the least, not to think of macroeconomic policies, and of the “macro-structural” (policy) 
mix, as part of the institutional operational system of any given modern economy.  
In this regard, the EU looks lopsided. It has developed, for almost two decades since the 
Single Act in 1986, a growth strategy along a structural pattern, with little consideration for 
economic governance.  
Yet, while the Single Market – although not fully – is largely enforced since 1993 and has 
also been reinforced, for six years now, by the single currency (the “Euro”), the EU growth 
performance for the last four years has been repeatedly deceptive and the overall assessment 
of the last European decade, when compared with the American and Asian performances, is 
nothing less than dismal (see Chart 1).  
The problem looks even more serious: the “juvenile” Asian economies put aside, the EU, 
not catching-up anymore since the mid-70’s, has been lagging behind the US economy for 
more than two decades by an estimated 30 % gap in GDP per capita (see, among many others, 
Sapir et al., 2003), this gap currently amounting, after the Eastward enlargement and the 
“roaring” American decade of the 90’s, to roughly 40%.  
The exact nature of the transatlantic gap must here be briefly highlighted and related to 
the p revious institutional considerations. The “American model”, made of flexibility, 
creativity and “risk-loving” culture, to which EU officials are often referring with envy (cf. 
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While the “structures” of the American economy undeniably played a major role in the 
phase of innovation and investment acceleration observed after 1995, the sparking and 
stabilizing effects of both monetary and fiscal policies throughout the decade, fostering in 
return, in the process of high non-inflationary growth, long-lasting efficient metamorphoses in 
the economy, must not be neglected (see Solow and Krueger, 2002 for an overview).  
Thus, beside the “deepening hypothesis”, according to which the EU integration would 
not yet be sufficient to deliver a durable high level of GDP growth, one of the reasons of the 
poor economic performance of the region might well be that the EU has not developed the 
coherent economic policy institutions able to make the most of its potentially powerful 
economic and monetary integration, in other words: the EU has not developed the coherent 
economic policy institutions able to foster its potential growth.  
 

















*: Asia is composed of China, India, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore.  
**: Mean annual growth rate of real GDP between 1990 (index 100) and 2004. 
Source: Fitoussi and Le Cacheux (2005).  
 
b. Potential growth and potential output: where do we stand? 
Determining potential growth and output is a crucial task in order to figure out the 
necessity and consequences of economic policies. The necessity of implementing a fiscal 
and/or a monetary policy depends on the output gap, i.e. the difference between actual and International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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potential output: economic policies may be effective only insofar as the output gap is negative. 
Consequences of economic policies also depend on the output gap: increasing fiscal deficits 
or reducing nominal interest rates for stabilization purposes when potential output is below 
actual output will prove inflationary and inefficient. Potential output and potential growth 
give also key information: high potential growth may attract long-term capital flows.  
Although potential output and the ensuing output gap are widely used by policymakers, 
and are thus crucial for designing an adequate if not optimal economic policy, two definitions 
still coexist and no consensus has arisen so far as regards a unique, uncontroversial estimation 
methodology.  
From a statistical point of view, potential output is computed as the trend or smooth 
component of actual GDP series. The underlying concept is thus totally disconnected with a 
specific economic theory and cannot explain the determinants of potential output: by 
construction, actual GDP smoothly fluctuates around potential output in the mid-run.  
If economic rationale prevails, potential output is generally said to be defined as the level 
of output consistent with a stable inflation rate. More precisely, it is the “ sustainable 
aggregate supply capabilities of an economy, as determined by the structure of production, 
the state of technology and the available inputs” (ECB, 2000). The estimation methodology 
thus depends on the time horizon: in the short run, the capital stock is constant and potential 
output only depends on the maximum utilization of inputs – capital and labor. Tensions only 
stem from the reduction of the gap between actual and maximum utilization rates. However, 
assessing those tensions necessitates that the degree of acceptance of tensions in the economy 
be known and constant over time. The same gap between actual and maximum utilization 
rates is not accepted similarly in an economy with low or strong aversion vis-à-vis inflation, 
for instance (Passet et al., 1997). As European economies have moved from low to strong 
aversion  vis-à-vis inflation since the mid-eighties, potential output may have been 
underestimated ever since. Moreover, the relatively inertial behavior of European 
policymakers, in comparison with their US counterparts, could be attributable to a change in 
social norms which has already been achieved in the US but which is still “on air” in Europe 
(see Fitoussi and Le Cacheux, 2005): lower aversion vis-à-vis inequalities in Europe would 
tend to let European authorities accept a higher natural rate of unemployment than in the 
Seventies.  
In the mid-run, potential output depends on the speed of and extent to which capital is 
accumulated. Technical progress is no longer considered as a constant data and its 
determinants have to be assessed. Measuring the dynamics of capital accumulation and the 
diffusion and determinants of technical progress remains a major theoretical, methodological 
and empirical issue (see  Section 1 of the Report). The calculations by Jorgenson and 
Motohashi (2004) on the contribution of information technology (IT) to effective growth in International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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Japan is a very good example: after harmonizing the national accounts for Japan and the USA, 
Jorgenson and Motohashi concluded that the gap between economic growth in Japan and in 
the USA is exclusively attributable to the drop in non-IT investment in Japan, as well as to a 
fall in employment, a conclusion which totally reversed past estimations.  
Assessing potential output is definitely not straightforward as potential output is not 
“observable”. Estimation techniques were twofold in the past
19. On the one hand, for those 
economists who acknowledged the statistical view of potential output, various trend and 
univariate methods were proposed: potential output was considered  as a linear trend 
component of actual output
20, but the trend component could also be extracted by a filter (the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP), the Baxter-King filter or the Kalman filter)
21.  
On the other hand, for those economists who acknowledged an economic view of 
potential output, a second type of methodology  – the production function approach  – has 
given the possibility of identifying the various factors contributing to potential growth.  
Both types of estimation methodology have its advantages and drawbacks. Statistical 
methods are easy to implement but since they draw extensively on past observations of actual 
output and do not give information on its determinants, they cannot serve the purpose of 
forecasting potential output or growth.  
Non-statistical structural methods rely on a specific economic theory and identify 
explicitly the factors that are driving economic growth: they can be used for forecasting 
purposes. Moreover, they are widely used by international institutions (OECD, IMF, etc.) and 
can be used for comparison purposes. The production-function approach is also recommended 
by the EU Economic Policy Committee (EPC, 2001). Cotis et al. (2004) note that this 
approach should be the preferred method for estimating potential output in Europe as it is, 
among the array of available methods, the most consistent with policy priority, namely 
achieving structural long-term targets like those induced by the Lisbon European Council (the 
target of a trend growth of 3 per cent per year over a decade). In order to meet this target, it is 
of the uppermost importance to know clearly which type of structural reforms in labor, 
product and capital markets is likely to drive future economic growth. Nevertheless, the 
production-function approach is not devoid of strong drawbacks: firstly, the appropriate form 
(Cobb-Douglas, CES, etc.) of the production function has to be chosen but no uncontroversial 
method can definitely discriminate between different specifications. Secondly, structural 
changes like those arising from a productivity shock are difficult to incorporate in stable 
estimated production functions. Thirdly, this approach raises the issue of how to measure 
                                                 
19 For a recent review, see Cotis et al., 2004; a comparison of various methods using European data is 
available in Chagny and Döpke (2001). See also Rennison (2003) with artificially-generated data.  
20 Or a split trend: trend output was calculated as a linear trend during a cycle, where the cycle is defined as 
a period between two peaks in economic growth.  
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OFCE  27
unobservable variables like total factor productivity (TFP) or the equilibrium (or natural) level 
of unemployment. As such, data on the stocks of labor and capital may be of poor quality to 
implement reliable estimations of production functions (although we will perform some rough 
tests using these stocks in a following section).  
It is highly probable that the reliance on total factor productivity (TFP) as a measure of 
technical progress is quite heavily biased by measurement errors. Both inputs are at stake. As 
for labor, the growth in labor productivity can be broken into three components: an increase in 
capital input per hour worked (or capital deepening), a rise in the growth of TFP or output per 
unit of input, and an increase in labor quality, labor input per hour worked, due to a shift 
toward better educated and more experienced labor force.  
On labor quality, three elements are noteworthy. Firstly, it is very likely that the quality 
of the labor force has to do with that of education: in some countries, mostly European ones, 
human capital is resulting from public involvement in providing education, hence from some 
part of public expenditures. This would mean that those expenditures may impinge positively 
on labor productivity and, consequently, on potential output.  
Secondly, the relationship between labor quality and employment quality has to be 
somewhat scrutinized: the changing organization of work after the decay of Taylorism is now 
said to have dramatically deteriorated safety and health of working people (see Askenazy, 
2004, for an enlightening presentation): cumulative trauma disorders would have been highly 
and positively correlated with innovative organization of work in the USA between 1984 and 
1994
22, and this would have been the case also in European countries since the beginning of 
the 1990s. The lower overall quality of employment may impinge  negatively  on labor 
productivity and on potential output.  
Thirdly, labor quality is dependent on the actual level of unemployment: potential output 
thus depends on effective output. Long-lasting unemployment is unfavorable to labor quality 
as it pushes some unemployed workers to quit the labor market via early retirement schemes: 
the average skill of the labor force then drops automatically. High unemployment is also 
unfavorable to labor quality as it discourages the young and married women (generally with 
kids) to try to enter on the labor market.  
As for capital, two major issues are at stake: as shown in Section 1 of the Report, the 
measurement of TFP is very sensitive to the assumption of a constant lifespan of equipment; 
and, adjusting prices of capital goods to better take into account the evolution in the quality of 
equipment drastically limits the contribution of TFP to potential growth and, conversely, 
accentuate the role of capital accumulation. 
                                                 
22 This trend has been reversed in the US due to the better account by business managers of the cost of these 
traumas in terms of productivity: safety and health of the working people has been enhanced. International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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It is noteworthy that the most recent empirical papers
23 now propose combining 
multivariate filtering techniques
24 with the production-function approach. This methodology 
thus combines a model-based approach to estimate potential output with explicit statistical 
assumptions concerning the estimation of the potential values of the components of the 
production function. Unfortunately, those sophisticated techniques do not help to discriminate 
between different specifications (Cobb-Douglas, translog, etc.) of the production function and 
may therefore remain highly sensitive to the chosen specification.  
As a conclusion to this general overview of the literature on potential growth, figures in 
table 1 should help to understand the substantial uncertainty surrounding the estimations on 
which economic policies are based. R emarks are threefold. Firstly, using the battery of 
estimations performed at the Banque de France, it appears that estimation results are highly 
sensitive to the estimation technique and that error margins for potential growth may be 
substantial (the case of France is rather emblematic in this regard).  
 
Table 1 . A comparison of different estimations for potential growth (average annual 
variations in %) 
    USA  Japan  Euro zone  Germany  France 
2002  BdF  [2.8;3.4]  [1.3;1.5]  [1.9;2.3]  [1.0;1.4]  [1.7;2.2] 
  OECD  2.9  1.2  2.0  1.5  1.9 
2003  BdF  [3.1;3.4]  [1.5;1.8]  [1.7;2.3]  [1.0;1.4]  [1.4;2.1] 
  OECD  3.2  1.3  1.9  1.6  2.3 
2004  BdF  [3.4;3.5]  [1.5;2.2]  [1.7;2.3]  [1.1;1.4]  [1.7;2.2] 
  OECD  2.9  1.3  1.9  1.6  2.2 
Sources: Cette et al. (2004), OECD. 
Note: Figures in brackets give the intervals of Banque de France estimations based upon six different 
techniques (production function, split trend, HP 1600, HP 7000, structural VAR and unobserved components). 
 
Secondly, estimations by different institutions give quite different results: for instance, 
OECD estimations for Japan are below the lower limit of Banque de France estimations.  
Thirdly, estimations of potential growth are not constant over a short time period (2002-
2004) although potential growth estimated via a production function (this is the case at the 
OECD) is a long-term economic indicator. In the United States, but also in France, potential 
growth may hence gain 0.3 point within a year: all else equal, and assuming that central banks 
follow a monetary rule with Taylor coefficients, mismatching potential growth by 0.3 point 
may lead to a false reaction in the short-run interest rate of at least 0.15 percentage point. For 
                                                 
23 See Chagny and Lemoine (2003) for a recent review and an application to the Euro zone. 
24 HP and Kalman filters are respectively extended to incorporate various structural relationships, notably a 
Phillips curve. Other multivariate techniques include unobserved components models and structural vector auto-
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the purpose of illustration, this would mean that if potential growth had been constantly 
underestimated by the US Fed, the short-run interest rate would not have grown from 1% to 
2% between July and October 2004, but from 1% to 2.6%. Surely, this would not be the same 
story.  
Uncertainty regarding the “good” estimation technique of potential output or potential 
growth, and the discrepancy of estimation results across techniques or over time surely has 
not facilitated the path towards the “ Lisbon strategy”  – the growth strategy decided and 
implemented at the turn of the century by the EU–: this discrepancy has added to “governance 
incoherence”. 
c. The “Lisbon strategy”: If desirable, is it possible?  
To fully understand how “governance incoherence” could stand in the way of an efficient 
European growth strategy, and on the verge of the Mid-term Review of the “Lisbon strategy” 
due next Spring, one has to recapture the essence of this strategy, as it was proposed and 
agreed upon in March 2000 (see Table 2). Europe’s “Millennium Goal”, the overall “ new 
strategic goal for the next decade” was “ to become the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more 
and better jobs and greater social cohesion.” 
The Lisbon strategy rests on a double economic diagnosis: the EU would suffer from a 
“labor deficit” and an “innovation deficit”. Both of them stem clearly from the following 
quotations (European Council, 2000): “More than 15 million Europeans are still out of work. 
The employment rate is too low and is characterized by insufficient participation in the labor 
market by women and older workers. Long-term structural unemployment and marked 
regional unemployment imbalances remain endemic in parts of the Union”, here for the 
“labor deficit”, and: “ The services sector is underdeveloped, particularly in the areas of 
telecommunications and the Internet. There is a widening skills gap, especially in information 
technology where increasing numbers of jobs remain unfilled. With the current improved 
economic situation, the time is right to undertake both economic and social reforms as part of 
a positive strategy which combines competitiveness and social cohesion”, here for the 
“innovation deficit”. 
One must also recall, as we will discuss this point later on, that both “innovation deficit” 
and “labor deficit” were to be abolished in a context of high growth, which was the case in the 
late 1990’s, made possible by  “applying an appropriate macro-economic policy mix” International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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(European Council, 2000). Finally, the strategy rested on one major governance instrument: 
“a new open method of coordination at all levels” in the EU.
25  
 
Table 2. The “Lisbon strategy” in a nutshell 
Potential growth 
rate component at 
stake* 
 









“Preparing t he  transition to a 
knowledge-based economy and society 
by  better policies for the information 
society and R&D, as well as by stepping 
up the process of structural reform for 
competitiveness and innovation and by 
completing the internal market”. 
 
 







“Modernizing the European social 
model, investing in people and combating 
social exclusion”. 
 
* : Authors’ terms. 
** : As stated in the “Presidency conclusions” of the Lisbon European Council (European Council, 2000).  
 
Many objections can be raised when examining  in details the Lisbon diagnosis. 
Blanchard (2003) for instance has showed that, of the two deficits, the “labor” one was by far 
the most important, since, according to his calculations, average GDP per hour worked in the 
Euro zone is only 5% less than in the US, France and Germany workers even producing 5% 
more per hour than their American homologues. He accordingly concludes that quantity is at 
stake in the per capita income gap with the US, not quality
26. In Section 1 of the Report, we 
have showed evidence that the gap with the US had more to do with non-ICT capital 
deepening and non-ICT TFP growth, hence on neither type of “Lisbon deficits”. 
                                                 
25 Stated shortly, the open method of coordination is a “soft unconstrained” coordination with variable 
geometry. Topics and countries involved are “variable” in this respect. 
26 The nature of this quantity gap then remaining to be determined, in the form of a “preference” in 
Blanchard view, or in the form of a constraint, for instance in Prescott’s terms (see Prescott, 2002).  International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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There is little doubt in the EU officials’ mind that something is wrong with the results 
obtained so far in the implementation of the Lisbon strategy. In fact, in the own European 
Council Presidency recent words, something like a partial failure is acknowledged: “The 
Union set itself ambitious goals in March 2000. Four years later, the picture is a mixed one.” 
[...] “the pace of reform needs to be significantly stepped up if the 2010 targets are to be 
achieved.” (European Council, 2004).  
While the importance of a proactive macro-structural policy mix is not stressed among 
recommendations to speed up the Lisbon process preparing the Mid-term review of the 
strategy next year
27, there are strong reasons to believe it should be: the main explanation of 
the Lisbon strategy failure so far might well be that implementing “structural  reforms” 
without a coherent growth-friendly macroeconomic governance is an impossible task
28. In 
brief, what the EU lacks to build the growth-deliverable and autonomous economy it deserves 
given its efforts is institutional coherence (see Chart 2).  
¤ The “innovation deficit” closing incoherence 
In the light of the modern theory of economic growth and stabilization policy, the 
relevance of the European economic governance given the objective of reducing or even 
abolishing the “innovation deficit” set by the “Lisbon strategy” must first be questioned.  
The EU “federal budget”, the Stability and Growth Pact, the ECB monetary policy and 
exchange rate management all appear to be ill-design instruments in this perspective.  
The EU budget is, at the same time, quite small (1% of the EU GNI) and almost fully 
devoted to agricultural and regional aides (80% of total spending)
29. As recently documented 
by the “Sapir Report” (Sapir et al., 2003), the amount left to “growth spending” at the EU 
level is almost negligible. This situation is likely to worsen in the EU-25, with new members 
planned to receive only 40 billions Euros in the next 3 years from the EU budget and old 
members willing to reduce their own contributions (strong claims to keep the EU budget at 
1% the EU GNI have been made by EU founding members). As is well known, new members 
are markedly less developed than the 15 older members; and this makes the negotiations over 
the future EU budget more difficult, especially in times of bad overall economic performance 
and very tight budget conditions in most member states.  
                                                 
27  To be fair, we must acknowledge that at least “an appropriate macroeconomic policy mix” is 
recommended. However, in the European view, the appropriate policy mix is desperately constituted of a “fiscal 
consolidation” and the so-called “sustainability of public finances”. Budgetary margins for maneuver are still 
conditional on countries having already sharply reduced their public deficits. The transition period and the 
influence of business cycles on deficits have long been absent from the Europe discourse.  
28 See the end of Section 2 for some investigation on this peculiar topic. 
29 These developments on the EU budget hinge extensively on Le Cacheux (2004). International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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Instead of reasoning on common goals and appropriate tools to reach them, the new 
negotiations over the size and structure of the EU budget for the next decade are dominated 
by a petty accounting logic and by the concern of major current contributors to minimize their 
net financial “burdens” and get closer to the “juste retour” once advocated by former British 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the early 1980s. 
Amounting to a little less than €100 billion in 2003 and due to rise to only €115 billion in 
2006, the European budget is both small, relative to national or even, some local budgets, and 
highly tilted towards two major expenditure items: the Common agricultural policy (CAP) 
eats up about €45 billion, and structural and regional policies about €33 billion. While the 
former has been considerably trimmed over the past ten years, in the process of adapting EU 
agriculture to the rules of world trade and of reducing public support to production prices and 
farmers’ incomes, structural policies have progressively emerged as the major financial 
instrument for promoting economic convergence and social and spatial cohesion amongst EU 
countries and regions. With their low income per capita and, for many of them, relatively 
large and backward agricultural sectors, the new member states would, in the absence of any 
change in the rules for distributing EU funds, have been important beneficiaries on both 
accounts. 
Although the mere idea of calculating net gains and losses may seem contrary to the spirit 
of European integration and the notion of financial solidarity that goes with it, it has become a 
habit to start all budgetary negotiations in the EU with an assessment of net financial gains 
and losses of each member state, and indeed to reason almost exclusively in these terms even 
in the course of the negotiation. In an effort to curb the opposition of net contributors vis-à-vis 
the extreme polarization of net benefits and contributions, which the new enlargement to 
relatively poor, and in some cases, agricultural countries, reinforces, the EU Commission has 
recently proposed a generalized correction formula for net budgetary balances of member 
states, that would leave no country with a net contribution larger than what all would regard 
as “fair”. Although such an approach may be necessary to win the support of major net 
contributors to a larger EU budget, it also tends to postpone the reflection on better sources of 
financing and to institutionalize the notion of “juste retour”, with all the theoretical objections 
and practical problems of assessment that may be raised against it.  
Rather than focusing the debates on the overall size of t he EU budget or on net 
contributions of member states, a more constructive and potentially more fruitful approach 
would emphasize the common objectives and possible collective goods that European 
countries recognize are willing to provide, either jointly through the direct intervention of the 
EU level via its budget, or indirectly, by inducing national governments to provide them. The 
way the EU Commission has tried to reformulate common policies and recast the various 
spending items in terms of major objectives (essentially competitiveness, cohesion and International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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external actions, see Table 3) is an interesting attempt in this direction, although it appears 
quite artificial and mostly cosmetic.  
 
Table 3. EU Planned expenditures under the 2007-2013 financial perspective (% of total 
budget) 
Policy heading  2006*  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013 
1a. Competitiveness  7.3  9.1  10.4  11.7  12.0  14.1  15.3  16.3 
1b. Cohesion  32.1  35.6  34.9  34.3  33.6  32.9  32.5  32.2 
2a. Agriculture  36.2  32.6  41.7  40.6  39.5  38.5  37.5  36.5 
2b. Other “sustainable management”  10.2  10.2  10.3  10.3  10.2  10.1  9.9  9.8 
3. Citizenship, security, etc.  1.1  1.2  1.5  1.6  1.8  2.0  2.1  2.3 
4. EU as global partner  9.3  8.5  8.8  9.0  9.4  9.7  9.8  9.9 
5. Administration  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8 
•  Due to a one-off adjustment made by the Commission in the current structure to make it 
comparable to the planned one, this column adds up to a little less than 100%. 
•  Sources: EU Commission, 2004, calculations by Begg (2004). 
 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), although widely and, at times, officially criticized 
for its weak theoretical rationale and poor record (see Fitoussi and Creel, 2002), is still in 
place. While not discriminating, as the “golden rule” for public finances for instance would do, 
between consumption and investment governmental spending, the SGP harms the potential 
growth of each Member State. The integration of ten new members, 60% of which violated 
the SGP at the date of their adhesion –after more than a decade of convergence– does not 
offer any perspective that the member States will feel safe enough to ease their common 
budgetary rule. Furthermore, the still informal propositions of reform of the SGP recently 
presented by the EU Commission do not allow national budgets to be more heavily used to 
foster innovation: the constraining rule of an overall public deficit below 3% of GDP remains, 
and only the enforcement of some procedures dedicated to the deviations from the rule would 
possibly be reformed. For instance, the time schedule for achieving the balanced-budget target 
would depend on economic circumstances (business cycles, the debt level, etc.).  
As for monetary policy, it should be reminded that the European Central Bank (ECB) is 
the most independent Central Bank in the world. It is also a young institution in search of 
credibility (see Fitoussi and Creel, 2002). These two elements explain why the ECB has, until 
now, shown little reaction in front of the deteriorating economic context in the EU since the 
downturn of 2001. The arrival of ten new members, many of which have officially announced 
their intention to join the Euro zone as fast as possible is, there also, likely to rigidify even International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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more the position of the European monetary institution, undermining effective and potential 
growth in the Euro zone, which accounts for more than 80% of the EU-25 GDP. Monetary 
policy, when carefully but effectively used (i.e. u nder “constrained discretion”,  see for 
instance Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997 and, for a reassessment, King, 2004), is a mighty tool to 
sustain high level of growth, that is to fully realize the potential of the economy. This 
stabilization policy naturally entails structural effects: maintaining unnecessarily high levels 
of real interest rate and/or mass unemployment, as it has been the case in the EU for most of 
the 90’s, harms long-term growth. 
Finally, exchange rate management, which is taken care of de facto by the ECB (but is de 
jure the shared custody of the ECB and the European Council) is also far from being coherent 
with the “Lisbon strategy”. To begin with, the Euro does not play a positive role in stabilizing 
the European economy: on the contrary, it is pro-cyclical since the beginning of the 90’s. The 
Euro has appreciated from 1991 to 1996, when growth was weak in Europe, it has depreciated 
from 1996 until 2000, when growth was strong and is it appreciating ever since, while Europe 
is experiencing a severe economic downturn (Chart 3).  
 
Chart 3. A destabilizing Euro 
 
Source: ECB Monthly Bulletin, December 2004. 
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The current organization of economic policies in Europe is thus at stake in that it is 
definitely incoherent with the major step towards  “more growth in Europe” which is the 
cornerstone of the Lisbon strategy. Another intriguing question has to do with evidence 
regarding the impact of public capital and/or public investment on economic growth. This is a 
major issue as the Lisbon strategy explicitly refers to “better policies” in the “transition to a 
knowledge-based economy”. Since the growth potential of a given economy relies mostly on 
its ability to accumulate endogenous technical progress, fiscal policy, notably through R & D 
and higher education spending, may be a powerful instrument of this social human capital 
accumulation. Can we infer from a look at the data that public policies and more specifically 
public investments are a key variable for explaining growth? 
¤ Public policy and endogenous growth? 
The neoclassical growth model  à la  Solow
30 states that actual growth per capita is 
conditional on capital and labor accumulation and on exogenous technological progress. 
Assuming decreasing returns to scale, output growth equals that of the population plus 
technical progress in the long run. Within this framework, it is straightforward that economic 
policies are devoid of an impact on growth per capita in the long run.  
This conclusion has been largely debated since the development of the so-called “New” 
growth theory which acknowledges the endogenous nature of technical progress and assigns a 
key role to fiscal policy as a determinant of long-run economic growth
31. Basically, extending 
inputs to public capital (or human capital) and fully taking into account the interactions 
between the three possible inputs, returns to scale may turn positive. These interactions may 
notably involve R & D expenditures. By their specific nature of non-rival goods, they may 
have positive externalities, spreading to broader technical progress and ensuring a social 
return superior a private, isolated, return. In this context, public intervention financing 
fundamental research, infrastructures, etc., may substantially enhance economic growth above 
the steady-state compatible with the assumption that goods and labor markets clear.  
Unfortunately, empirical evidence on the links between public capital and economic 
growth are still debatable, with the output elasticity of public capital ranging from 6% to 70%, 
depending on the sample used or the country studied (see Table 4).  
According to Kneller et al. (1999), results are extremely  ad hoc because they lack a 
complete specification of the government budget constraint. Kneller et al. (1999) perform 
empirical tests in which they distinguish between productive/unproductive expenditures and 
distortionary/non-distortionary taxes and show that financing expenditures counts. The 
                                                 
30 See Solow (1999) for an extensive presentation.  
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endogenous growth theory outcome would only be met had distortionary taxes remained 
constant.  Noteworthy however, Kneller et al. did not investigate the possibility that 
expenditures could be financed by public bonds’ issuance. In an intergenerational logic, the 
fact that productive expenditures could be financed by public debt seems appropriate.  
 
Table 4. A parsimonious survey on the contribution of public capital to economic growth 
Methodology  Contribution of public capital to economic growth  
Production-function approach       Elasticity 
Ratner (1983)                       = 0.056 (US data) 
Aschauer (1989)                       = [0.29, 0.56] depending on assumptions 
regarding productivity (US data)  
Ram and Ramsey (1989)                       = 0.24 (US data) 
Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1992)                        = 0.05 (48 US states)  
Eisner (1994)                       = 0.27 (US data) 
Sturm and De Haan (1995)                       = 0.41 (US data) 
Vijverberg et al. (1997)                       = 0.48 (US data) 
Evans and Karras (1994)                       estimates are fragile and generally not 
                     significant (7 OECD countries)  
Dessus and Herrera (1996)                       = 0.26 (panel, 28 countries) 
Merriman (1990)                        = 0.58 (9 Japanese regions) 
Berndt and Hansson (1991)                       = 0.68 (Swedish data) 
Bajo-Rubio et al. (1993)                       = 0.19 (Spanish data) 
Otto and Voss (1994)                       = 0.38 (Australian data) 
Wylie (1996)                       = 0.51 (Canadian data) 
Gong et al. (2004)                       = 0.50 (US data) 
                     = 0.29 (German data) 
Estimations including the budget composition   
Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmel (1999) 
Bleaney, Gemmel and Kneller (2001) 
     a 1-point increase in productive public expenditures 
increases per capita growth by 0.29 point; and a 1-point 
increase in distortionary taxation decreases per capita 
growth by 0.45 point.  
 
Considering the wide range of output elasticity to public capital in the literature, we have 
decided to add our own estimations. W e have performed some rough estimations of the 
production function with an application to the US, Japan and the Euro zone. For the latter, two 
different specifications have been proposed: an aggregate specification and a panel 
specification. Results clearly show that public investment has a significant and substantial 
favorable impact on output in the US and the  Euro zone, but not in Japan. The “Lisbon 
strategy” in Europe is legitimized by the data.  




- =                    (1) 
where N denotes labor, K is the stock of private capital and KG is the stock of government 
capital. It is assumed here that producers  face constant returns to scale in the two private 
inputs, and increasing returns to scale in all three inputs.  International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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After log-linearization and stated in first difference, eqn. (1) can be rewritten as 
(1) G YNII ssh D=-D++                  (2) 
where a “ D” denotes a growth rate, I is (gross) private investment and I G is (gross) public 
investment.  
Disregarding at this stage the depreciation rate of the capital stock, unconstrained 
estimations of eqn. (2) for the US, Japan and the  Euro zone are reported in table 5. Like 
Kneller et al. (1999), though not on a 22-country panel, we find that initial GDP enters all 
regressions with a significant negative coefficient, henceforth indicating conditional 
convergence of growth rates over the period.  
Labor force growth, estimated via total employment series available in the OECD dataset, 
enters all regressions with a significant positive coefficient; that of the US is quite substantial 
and that could be due to estimations implemented without having introduced sufficient 
constraints on the coefficients.  
In the US case, increasing returns to scale in all inputs is clearly noticeable. In Japan, 
results indicate constant returns to scale in three inputs, whereas they would be decreasing in 
the Euro zone.  
As far as public investment is concerned, it enters the regression with a significant 
positive coefficient in the US, though the elasticity is low and closer to that found by Ratner 
(1983) than by other studies performed since then (see Table 4). Public investment is not a 
significant determinant of economic growth in Japan and the Euro zone, except in the latter 
when a panel estimation is performed. In this case, the elasticity of output to public capital is 
very low (1.3%) but it is positive.  
Though these results are not econometrically non debatable
32, they illustrate three 
important features as regards the application of endogenous growth theory to the US, Japan 
and the Euro zone. Firstly, endogenous growth seems to work in the former country, but 
thanks to the major influence of labor on private output. This is an argument in favor of a new 
strand of literature which tries to capture the positive influence of labor organization on 
private output (see Askenazy, 2003, for a recent presentation).  
Secondly, though public investment does not seem to be a significant determinant of 
output growth in Japan, constant returns to scale are attainable. In the recent past, the low and 
persistent economic growth in Japan has surely not been exclusively due to private inputs, but 
also to financial fragilities which have led governments to intervene massively “to the rescue” 
and to divert attention from public investment. In more “normal” times, inputs, be they private 
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or public, may play a more crucial role in Japan’s economic growth; the “at-least-constant 
returns to scale” would thus be confirmed. 
Thirdly, in the  Euro zone, the recurrent call for an innovation strategy, for a better 
competitiveness of the whole area and high potential growth seems largely unmet by the data 
in table 5: one could thus presume that decreasing returns to scale testify for a failure of the 
European economic strategy. Europe would have “missed the train” of enhancing growth.  
 
Table 5. Estimations of production functions – explained variable DGDP – annual data 
over the sample 1960-2003 


















































0.69  0.79  0.64  0.44 
see  0.011  0.017  0.009  0.018 
D-W  2.08  1.59  1.92  - 
a: sample 1970-2003. 
b: including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. We are 
grateful to Gwenaëlle Poilon for able research assistance. 
t-stat in parentheses.  
Source: OECD. 
 
However, some more tests performed in levels show that at least constant returns to scale 
are attainable in the Euro zone, like in the Japanese case (see Table 6). There would thus be 
some scope for adopting an ambitious economic growth strategy. As shown in table 6, the 
elasticity of output to public capital would equal 30% on average. Estimated with fixed effects, 
elasticity would range from 8% for Germany to 16% for Ireland. Unfortunately, the constant 
term is significantly negative and total employment enters the regression with a much higher 
coefficient (i.e. four times higher) than without fixed effects.  International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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Table 6. Production function estimations in levels – Euro zone* – annual data over the 
sample 1965-2002 
  Panel without fixed effects  Panel with fixed effects 








Public capital  0.30 
(12.4) 
- 




     
Austria  -  0.12 
(5.2) 
Belgium   -  0.13 
(5.2) 
Germany  -  0.08 
(3.6) 
Spain  -  0.10 
(4.3) 
France  -  0.09 
(4.1) 
Greece  -  0.12 
(4.7) 
Ireland  -  0.16 
(6.5) 
Italy  -  0.09 
(3.9) 





0.99  0.99 
see  0.13  0.05 
*: including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. We are 
grateful to Gwenaëlle Poilon for able research assi stance. 
t-stat in parentheses.  
Source: OECD. 
 
The discrepancy between the elasticity of output to public capital in the Euro zone in 
table  5 and table  6 ensues first from the difference in the specifications: the first panel 
regression (in Table 5) takes conditional convergence into account. A second reason for this 
discrepancy may stem from overestimation or simply bad estimation of “public capital”. 
Statistics related to the flows of government fixed capital formation are generally more 
accurate and homogenous across countries than capital stock figures. Overestimation may 
also stem from the inability of statisticians to take fully into account the depreciation of 
capital: in an era of strong innovation, the depreciation of the capital stock may be quite high 
(see Section 1 of the Report).  International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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In order to gain more insight in the understanding of the incidence of public investment 
on domestic growth, we also employ an unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR) model and 
analyze the dynamic interactions between public investment, private investment, employment 
(in first difference) and output growth. Impulse response functions and variance 
decompositions help to quantify the dynamic relationships and an international comparison is 
also performed.  
A summary of previous VAR studies dedicated to the empirics of growth is reported in 
table 7. Except for the Netherlands at the end of the Nineteenth century (Sturm et al., 1995), 
public capital or public investment has not had a significant impact on economic growth. As 
we shall see below, our results are somewhat more promising.  
 
Table 7. Growth studies performed with VARs  
Study  Data  Model  Variables 
a  Conclusions 
Clarida (1993)  US, France, 
Germany, UK 
VECM  MFP, KGV  MFP and KGV are 
cointegrated but 
direction of 
causality is unclear 
McMillin and 
Smyth (1994) 








effect of KGV 
Sturm et al. (1995)  Netherlands, 1853-
1913 
VAR  Q, KPV, KGV, L  Infrastructure 
Granger-causes 
output 




VAR  Q, KPV, KGV, H  No relationship 
between public 
capital and labour 




Voss (2002)  US, 1947-1998 
Canada, 1947-1996 
VAR  GDP, pg, pp, 
IG/GDP, I/GDP, r 
IG crowd out I in 
both countries 
a: MFP: multifactor productivity; KPV: private capital stock; L: private labor; Y: private sector GDP; KGV: 
public capital stock; H/KPV: hours of work per unit of capital; P
E/P
Q: relative price of energy, pg: relative price 
of public sector investment good; pp: relative price of private sector investment good; r: real interest rate.  
 
Within an unrestricted VAR, every endogenous variable is modeled as a function of its 
own lagged values and the lagged values of the other endogenous variables in the system. The 
ordering of endogenous variables is clearly an important task in the context of annual data: it 
is assumed here that output is the most endogenous of all variables; this assumption 
corresponds to specification (2) ensuing from a production function. Moreover, public 
investment is assumed to be the least endogenous of all variables, meaning that private 
investment immediately responds (i.e. within a year) to a contemporaneous innovation in 
public investment.  International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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Our estimated VAR is of the form:  
'[] tKtttt ZIIETGDP = ,                  (3) 
where ET is total employment. All variables are in log; public and private investments are in 
levels whereas ET and GDP are in first difference.  
Although some variables are non stationary
33, the VAR  has been estimated  under the 
form given in (3) for the USA, Japan and the Euro zone. Except in the case of Japan, such a 
specification is reasonable.  Performing VAR by ordinary least squares with cointegrated 
though non-stationary variables is acceptable, as discussed by Sims, Stock and Watson (1990). 
For the USA, public investment is non stationary but Johansen cointegration technique 
indicated at least 3 cointegration relations between the 4 endogenous variables.  
For the Euro zone, public and private investments are respectively non stationary but 
Johansen cointegration technique indicated at least 2 cointegration relations.  
For Japan, over the full sample, public investment is non stationary and no cointegration 
relation has been found. The VAR estimation is thus only a “rough” illustration of the 
dynamic interactions between the endogenous variables. Over a short sample however – the 
most recent years are discarded and the sample covers 1960-1990  –, although public 
investment was still non stationary, Johansen cointegration technique indicated at least 2 
cointegration relations, so that we have been able to perform a rigorous unrestricted VAR.  
Results from the impulse response functions (IRF, see appendix 1) confirm previous 
estimations via a production-function approach but they also shed light on the causality 
between private and public investment.  
On the one hand, an innovation in public investment has a positive and significant impact 
on GDP only in the USA. Between 1960 and 1990, one can find the same significant impact 
in Japan, but over the whole sample, this effect disappears.  
On the other hand, in the Euro zone, despite no significant impact on economic growth, a 
positive innovation on public investment has at least a three-year long positive impact on 
private investment and growth in total employment. Moreover, a positive innovation on 
private investment also has a positive significant impact on public investment, growth in total 
employment and economic growth, hence revealing a virtuous circle between public 
investment, private investment and growth in the Euro zone. In the USA, private investment 
has no impact on public investment; whereas in Japan, over the full sample, a causal relation 
between private and public investment is identified up to 4 years after the shock on private 
                                                 
33 Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests have been performed.  International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
OFCE  43
investment has occurred, but no virtuous circle (i.e. a two-direction causation) can be 
identified.  
Variance decomposition provides information on the quantitative importance of 
stochastic shocks to the 4 variables in the system. In appendix 1, the k-steps ahead forecast 
error of economic growth in the USA, Japan and the  Euro zone, are explained by the 
contemporaneous shocks on the 4 variables.  
In the USA, a non-marginal share of the variation in economic growth is due to 
innovations in public investment (15% in year 1), although this share decreases over time 
(13% in year 10). In Japan and, most noteworthy, in the Euro zone, the trend is reversed: the 
share due to innovations in public investment is increasing, from 4% (year 1) to 9 % (year 10) 
and from 9% (year 1) and 13% (year 10) respectively. All in all, the influence of public 
investment on economic growth, estimated via the variance decomposition, is quite similar 
from one country to the other.  
The main difference occurs between the Euro zone, on the one hand, and the USA and 
Japan, on the other hand, as far as employment and GDP exogeneity are concerned. Whereas 
the highest share of economic growth is explained by shocks on private investment in the 
USA and Japan (almost 70% in year 10), this share is about one-third in the  Euro zone; 
another one-third is explained by innovations on employment growth (a change in working 
time, for instance) and one-fifth of economic growth is due to exogenous factors. In 
comparison with the USA and Japan, economic growth variations in Europe have numerous 
determinants. Enhancing growth thus necessitates implementing a tri-dimensional policy: 
boosting employment, private investment and public investment is a major challenge.  
As a conclusion to this general overview of the determinants of output and economic 
growth in the USA, Japan and the Euro zone, it is now straightforward that public investment 
has a key importance; although it is solely responsible for a small share of economic growth 
in the best case, it has been shown that a virtuous circle could be revealed in the case of the 
Euro zone.  
¤ The “labor deficit” closing incoherence  
One of the most underestimated features of the “ labor deficit” diagnosis is the socio-
economic impact of massive unemployment experienced by the EU for two decades. This is 
problematic, since two important consequences derive from the structurally depressed 
European  labor market.  The EU willingness, but apparent incapacity, to close its “ labor 
deficit” is  indeed related to the role played by both “ Keynesian” and “Classical” 
unemployment in maintaining low participation rates of the working age population as well as 
in crystallizing a strong feeling of social insecurity (see Chart 2), at the source of the rational International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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resistance of workers to alter the structures or change the rules of existing social systems (i.e. 
The Welfare State).  
To begin with, there is little doubt that macroeconomic policies, and specially the 
excessively recessive monetary policy that has been the specific feature of the EU in the 90’s, 
have played a major role in the over-accumulation of Keynesian unemployment phases that 
have resulted in structural unemployment, through “hysteresis” of the unemployment rate, on 
the European Continent. Second, the “modernization of the European social model” prone by 
the  Lisbon strategy is logically strongly resisted in a context of soft growth and rigid 
macroeconomic management by populations with no perspective of full-employment, 
stagnant wages, and job insecurity experience
34.  
What is thus at stake is the relationship between  the policy mix and labor market 
institutions, that we have already labeled the “macro-structural” mix. In a recent work (Creel 
and Fitoussi, 2001), we have performed panel estimations of the growth in the unemployment 
rate  for the major OECD countries. Our departure point  has been the following:  over the 
1970-1995 period
35, unemployment increased steadily in most OECD countries, but the trend 
varied markedly from country to country. In order to take into account both dimensions, a 
panel data approach has seemed appropriate. 
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) also investigated the interaction between institutions and 
shocks, with much emphasis on the real interest rate.  They estimated unemployment 
equations in a panel of 5-years-average variables from 1960 to 1995, and considered the 
effects of macroeconomic shocks
36, institutions
37, and their interactions. They concluded that 
interactions between shocks and institutions explain the evolution of unemployment over time 
and across countries in a better way than shocks or institutions separately. Contrary to them, 
we will investigate the determinants of unemployment growth and give much emphasis on 
fiscal policy.  
We here rely on a panel of 12 OECD countries, and more than 80 variables over 20 years 
are involved in the robustness tests; the data set covers various topics from  labor market 
                                                 
34 Job insecurity is dramatically important in the new EU members, mostly the Central and Eastern 
European ones (see Cazes and Nesporova, 2004, for a comprehensive analysis). 
35 Stopping in 1995 can be explained by the fact that we wanted to reduce the incidence on the estimators of 
the convergence process towards the European Monetary Union in some of the countries under study. As most of 
them were carrying out restrictive fiscal policies (following the Maastricht criteria) and were undergoing still 
large unemployment rates, they were living “exceptional circumstances” that would have been very difficult to 
tackle in the estimations. Unfortunately, those “exceptional circumstances” were not short-lived. 
36 Namely, total factor productivity growth, real interest rates and the difference between effective and 
equilibrium unemployment. 
37 Namely, replacement rate, employment protection, the number of years over which unemployment 
benefits are paid, active labor market policies, tax wedge, union contract coverage, union density and union and 
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structures to the macroeconomic environment. Two complementary panel techniques are 
used
38.  
Firstly, Leamer (1983)  Levine & Renelt (1992) robustness tests are performed for each 
variable. The result is a list of variables that cannot be excluded as potential determinants of 
unemployment growth.  
Secondly, we estimate unemployment equations that always include labor force growth 
and (at least) one of the robust determinants identified in the first step. We thus analyze the 
effect of these variables on unemployment growth once the impact of labor force growth has 
been controlled for.  
Robustness tests for the cross-effects of institutions and economic policies led us to 
discard the monetary stance since it has never proven robust
39. As for the fiscal stance, it is 
robust only if it is crossed with the replacement rate, union coverage or employment 
protection.  
Indeed, introducing the primary structural surplus, i.e. the cyclically-adjusted surplus, to 
which net interests are added, and institutions, gives significant results in the Nineties, but has 
no effect before (see Table 8). The sign of significant cross effects is always negative: higher 
surpluses combined with rigid institutions
40 tend to decrease unemployment growth; or, 
higher deficits combined with flexible institutions tend to decrease unemployment growth.  
The assignment problem of Mundell (1962) thus can be adapted to fiscal policies and 
institutions,  hence to the “macro-structural” mix. Assuming that both “instruments”, fiscal 
policy on the one hand, labor-market institutions on the other, can be assigned two targets, 
unemployment and inflation, two possible configurations may emerge from their 
relationships: fiscal policy (resp. institutions) could be aimed at reducing unemployment 
while institutions related to the labor market (resp. fiscal policy) would curb inflation.  
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39 The monetary stance has been computed as the discrepancy between the actual nominal interest rate and 
the nominal rate inferred from a Taylor-rule estimation. The monetary stance is more or less the unexpected 
discretionary part of monetary policy. 
40 By rigid institutions, we mean high replacement rates, high union coverage and high employment 
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Source: Creel and Fitoussi (2001). 
 
The choice between both configurations should depend on the relative efficiency of 
instruments on the different targets, as in Mundell (1962). According to the first configuration, 
fiscal policy would boost aggregate demand to reduce unemployment while flexible labor-
market institutions would curb wage and inflation pressure arising from the decrease in 
unemployment. In the second configuration, fiscal policy would limit the extent to which 
Table 8: Unemployment equations with cross-effects
A. Cross-effects of the primary structural surplus (PSS) and the replacement rate (RR)
Active Pop. Const. pss*rr R²
1975-1980
coefficient -6,269 0,145 0,000 0,192
t-stat -3,405 5,484 1,706
1981-1989
coefficient -1,368 -0,013 0,000 0,012
t-stat -0,995 -0,842 -0,507
1990-1995
coefficient -6,818 0,093 -0,001 0,454
t-stat -4,398 6,483 -4,033
B. Cross-effects of the primary structural surplus (PSS) and union coverage (UC)
Active Pop. Const. pss*uc R²
1975-1980
coefficient -6,330 0,148 0,000 0,189
t-stat -3,430 5,525 1,635
1981-1989
coefficient -1,399 -0,013 0,000 0,015
t-stat -1,021 -0,803 -0,764
1990-1995
coefficient -6,746 0,092 -0,001 0,476
t-stat -4,450 6,551 -4,399
C. Cross-effects of the primary structural surplus (PSS) and employment protection (EP)
Active Pop. Const. pss*ep R²
1975-1980
coefficient -6,395 0,147 0,001 0,177
t-stat -3,431 5,445 1,313
1981-1989
coefficient -1,160 -0,016 0,000 0,012
t-stat -0,841 -1,038 0,566
1990-1995
coefficient -7,815 0,097 -0,002 0,387
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demand might be in excess to aggregate supply, hence curbing inflation, while active labor-
market institutions would preserve employment and social cohesion.  
Results are such that they entail that in some countries, fiscal policies are still efficient in 
reducing unemployment, but that their efficiency is conditional on the existence of relatively 
flexible labor institutions. Strong constraints on fiscal policy in the EU, within the Stability 
and Growth Pact and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, do appear illegitimate so long as 
the Welfare State is also being dismantled. As stated in the introduction to this second Section 
of the Report, a better coordination between institutions, among which economic policies 
shall be taken into account, is dramatically needed. 
2. Governance scenarios: the importance of being coherent 
a. The “European Constitution”: a non-economic governance event 
This analysis of the EU institutional stakes shows why it would be hardly conceivable to 
consider the prospect of growth in the EU in the next decade without contemplating 
alternative economic governance scenarios and their outcomes. In this regard, the perspective 
of the ratification, by all member States’ population or Parliaments, of the “European 
Constitution” signed last October by EU governments should be an important event
41.  
The reason this is hardly the case, is that, although the text contains in its Third Part the 
provisions regulating the economic governance of the EMU, it does not contain any 
significant change of the current governance system, which negative impact has been detailed 
above
42.  
This  amazing  status quo is  in itself quite  easily understood when one recalls the 
conditions under which the Third Part of the European “Constitution” has been aggregated to 
the rest of the text, in the very end of the “Convention for the future of Europe” sessions and 
without any debate.  
b. Two scenarios for the economic future of Europe 
Given our analyses, two credible scenarios are foreseeable, based on the idea that the 
“Lisbon strategy” can not be attained within the existing European g overnance framework. 
Hence, two trade-offs appear to be conceivable: the first one consists in reforming the EU 
governance instruments to reach the Lisbon goals. The second one consists in reforming the 
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“Lisbon strategy” to make it coherent with the current orientation of economic policies in the 
EU.  
The first, at this time, unfortunately, the most probable, would result in a “Frozen 
Landscape” of the EU growth strategy under the impact of the enlargement: A even smaller 
central budget, a stronger fiscal surveillance without reform of the SGP, a credibility-focused 
monetary policy; the growth outcome attached to this perspective is at best stable, meaning 
the pursuit of the dismal decade into the new century.  
The second one, “Fulfilled Potential”, optimistically predicts a reform of the economic 
governance of the EU and the definition of an integrated growth strategy, implying a 
substantial growth-orientated EU budget, a more public investment-friendly SGP and a 
growth-focused ECB. The growth outcome attached to it is naturally positive.  
The “Frozen  Landscape” is unfortunately for EU growth prospects the most likely 
scenario because the latest enlargement has enhanced the relative position of “small 
countries”  vis-à-vis “large countries”: as already mentioned, EU newcomers are relatively 
poor (though EU-25 has seen its population grow by 20%, its GDP has only increased by a 
mere 5%)
43 and wide-opened to international trade. Their reliance on  good competitiveness 
for growth purposes is thus higher than that of “large countries” whose main growth engine 
comes from domestic side (consumption, investment). “Small countries”  face incentives to 
abide by rules that ensure stable prices (or low inflation rates) via a strong monetary policy 
and a strict nominal exchange rate anchor (such is the case for the smallest newcomers like 
Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia, and, to a lesser extent, Hungary).  
As for the “Fulfilled Potential, it is sensitive to the assumption that the objective of the 
ECB would be enlarged to also embody a “growth objective”, quite similarly to the US Fed ‘s 
twin objectives. As was already mentioned earlier, the “European Constitution” (still to be 
adopted) does not go in the good direction. What is worse: the “Constitution” project now 
includes “price stability” within the general EU objectives and almost definitely legitimizes 
the ECB policy, although the “Convention” intended to prepare the “Constitution” project at 
least could have proposed an upheaval in the Maastricht treaty. 
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Section 3 . Simulating convergence scenarios with the 
INGENUE model 
Even though the scenarios described in the previous Section of the Report are obviously 
complex, and involve many dimensions of the economic and social policies of the EU, it 
would appear desirable to try to evaluate their likely consequences on the long-run evolutions 
of the European economy as well as, possibly, on the rest of the world. What we propose in 
this Section is an exploration of some significant dimensions of these complex scenarios, by 
numerically simulating a large, overlapping-generations, general-equilibrium model of the 
world economy, the INGENUE model. 
1. A brief overview of the INGENUE model
44 
The INGENUE model is a multi-region, world model, in the spirit of those developed by 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, chap. 3), in which the structure of each regional economy is in the 
line of other applied, Overlapping Generations, General Equilibrium (OGGE) models, such as 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff’s (1987). 
In the INGENUE model v.2, the world is divided in 10 regions according to geographical 
criteria: Western Europe 
(’Denmark’, ’Finland’, ’Iceland’, ’Ireland’, ’Norway’, ’Sweden’, ’United 
Kingdom’, ’Greece’, ’Italy’, ’Malta’, ’Portugal’, ’Spain’, ’Austria’, ’Belgium’, ’France’, ’Ger
many’, ’Luxembourg’, ’Netherlands’, ’Switzerland’), Eastern Europe (‘Estonia’, ’Latvia’, 
Lithuania’, ’Bulgaria’, ’Czech 
Republic’, ’Hungary’, ’Poland’ ’Romania’, ’Slovakia’, ’Slovenia’), Japan, North America, 
South America, Chinese World, Indian World, Russian World, Mediterranean World and 
Sub-Saharian Africa.  
The period of the model is set to five years. In each region, the economy is populated by 
21 overlapping generations of one-sex agents who may not live longer than 105 years. 
Population evolutions are exogenously calculated according to a standard population 
projection method on the basis of historical and prospective UN data
45. Each economic region 
is made up of three sectors: the households, the firms and the public sector. 
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a. Households 
Individuals are assumed to become adults when they turn 20. During each period, the 
household sector is then made of 17 overlapping cohorts of “adults”, of age between 20 and 
105, and 4 cohorts of “young”. Adults may not stay in the labor force after a legal maximal 
mandatory retirement age. Labor supply is exogenous – with the possibility of exogenously 
changing participation rates – and economic decisions are their consumption, savings and 
bequest decisions, made under perfect foresight at the beginning of their adult life. Voluntary 
bequests are distributed to children according to the fertility calendar of their deceased parents. 
In our international context, households can choose the region they want for investing their 
wealth. Due to life uncertainty at the individual level, one may expect unintended bequests; 
instead, in the spirit of Yaari (1965), it has been assumed that there exists perfect annuities 
markets that pool death risk within the same generation so that the return to capital is 
“corrected” by the instantaneous survival probability of the generation. 
Between 15 and 50 yrs. adults are supposed to give birth to children, according to the 
fertility calendar. Children are dependent until they turn 20, they consume with a cost per 
child that is supposed to be proportional to the parents consumption. People may work since 
the age of 10, so we take into account children labor income to the budget constraint of their 
parents.  
b. The public sector 
The public sector is reduced to a social security department; it is a pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) public pension scheme that is supposed to exist in all regions of the world. It is 
financed by a payroll tax on all labor incomes and pays pensions to retired households. The 
regional PAYG systems operate according to a defined-benefit rule: pensions  paid to 
individual retired are a fraction  or replacement rate – of the current average (net of tax) wage. 
We assume a time-to-time balanced-budget rule. 
c. Production side 
The production side is composed of two sectors: an intermediate good sector and a final 
good  one.  Each zone specializes in the production of a single, imperfectly substitutable, 
intermediate good with a constant return to scale technology using capital stock and the 
domestic labor force. International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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In the spirit of Backus et al. (1995), we assume that the domestic, composite final good of 
a region (consumption and investment)  is produced thanks to a combination of two 
intermediate goods: a “domestic” intermediate good and an “imported” intermediate good
46. 
For a world model to be realistic, the world asset capital  market has to be imperfect. 
Because sources of imperfections and asymmetries in financial markets are various and 
uneasy to model with rigorous micro-foundations in such a large-scale model as INGENUE, 
we have adopted an  ad hoc  formulation linking the region-specific rate of economic 
depreciation and the aggregate wealth across overall cohorts in this region. Aggregate 
financial wealth is equal to the sum of the region capital stock and the net assets on the rest of 
the world. Hence, capital invested in a region  z depreciates more rapidly than the average 
when the region is a net debtor of the rest of the world: the net-of-depreciation return from 
capital invested in indebted regions are, other things being equal, lower than in creditor 
regions. 
In each productive sector, and in each region, the level of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
is exogenous and grows at a constant rate. This rate is the result of a given, exogenous growth 
of 2% per annum in North America, supposed to be the technological leader, and a region-
sector-specific, exogenous, catching-up factor, reflecting international diffusion of 
technological progress
47. This formulation of the productive sector implies the existence of 
real effective exchange rates between the different regions. Here the main determinants of 
exchange rates are the relative productivities in the two productive sectors as in the standard 
view developed since Obstfeld and Rogoff works (i.e. the famous Balassa-Samuelson effect 
that is predominant in long run explanations of difference in real exchange rates). 
d. The competitive world equilibrium 
Given the initial stock of capital installed in each zone, initial distributions of savings 
across age groups and zones, initial prices and exogenous population prospects with the 
children distribution, the technical progress process and social security policies that satisfy a 
balanced-budget rule, a competitive world equilibrium with social security is a set of 
sequences for prices and social security transfers and an allocation of quantities such that for 
each period: 
 Households maximize behavior;  
 Firms maximize profit in intermediate and final good sectors;  
 A fictive world producer of an homogenous world intermediate good maximizes profit; 
and 
                                                 
46 This “imported” intermediate good is an aggregate of all the intermediate goods. 
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 Markets are cleared. 
e. Calibration 
The INGENUE model v.2 has been calibrated with aggregate data covering the period 
1960-2000, to fit the average observed values over the 1995-2000 period. Data include: trade 
balances, current account balances, GDP per capita, savings and investment. 
2. UE growth scenarios and enlargement 
Various convergence scenarios may be simulated with the INGENUE model, yielding 
long-term evolutions of macroeconomic variables in the UE-15, in the Eastern-European 
newcomers, and in the rest of the world. In the following, we focus our analysis on the first 
half of the century (until 2050) and on outcomes in the two European zones: given the relative 
size of Eastern Europe, the induced effects of various convergence paths on the rest of the 
world are of a very small magnitude and will not be discussed. 
a. A baseline scenario for the world economy 
In the reference scenario chosen for the world economy in the INGENUE model v.2, the 
populations of the various areas of the world are internationally mostly immobile, with only 
minor migration flows, in accordance with the UN demographic projections; the evolutions of 
each area’s population are thus driven by the assumed fertility and mortality rates, according 
to the central demographic scenario of the UN.  
In addition, it has been assumed that existing institutional differences amongst the ten 
areas of the world defined in the model – in particular the differences in the generosity of the 
public, pay-as-you-go, pension systems, as measured by the replacement ratios  – persist 
indefinitely. In such a context, the main driving forces behind the economic evolutions of the 
various regions of the world are the demographic changes and the assumed pace of exogenous 
technical progress in the production sectors. As in the INGENUE model v.1 (INGENUE, 
2002; IMF, 2004), the  baseline scenario is characterized by relatively conservative 
assumptions with regard to the latter: indeed, it is assumed that the exogenous rate of 
technical progress in the leading economy – i.e. the US – is constant at its long-term estimated 
level of 1.7% per annum, and that all other economies of the world are catching-up relatively 
slowly, according to an exogenously imposed low of motion of each region’s TFP (see Chart 
1, a)
48.  
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Although we have introduced differences to take into account the different economic 
dynamism of the various regions – in particular China and India , this scenario is slightly 
pessimistic, in that the relative per-capita GDP remain widely dispersed (see Chart 1, b). Even 
within the EU, the differences between the EU-15 and the newcomers are extremely persistent 
in the baseline scenario.  
b. Migrations 
Thanks to the detailed demographic module integrated in the INGENUE model v.2, it is 
possible to simulate the economic effects of various migration assumptions. The scenario on 
which we focus in this paper is meant to represent the consequences of an extension to 
Eastern European countries of the Schengen agreement, which allows in principle the fully 
free mobility of people, i.e. labor migration.  
Given the existing differences in the generosity of the social protection systems in the 
two European regions
49, it may be assumed that such a move would induce a significant 
increase in migrations from Eastern to Western European countries.  However,  the free 
mobility in the whole EU of people from its Eastern part has been postponed until, at best, 
2007, and, at worst, 2011, and most empirical studies on this topic evaluate the inflow of 
Eastern migrants to the West at approximately 2% of Eastern Europe workforce. In this 
scenario, the number of Eastern European migrating to Western Europe thus leaps in 2010 
from current small levels to a rise of .8% of their workforce that vanishes progressively (we 
use an autoregressive shock with coefficient .6). 
Expectedly (see Chart 2, a, b, c), the economic consequences of this migration scenario 
are quite dramatic for the countries of origin, which bear a drop in their working age 
population, hence in potential and economic growth. In Western Europe, the consequences are 
clearly beneficial, both in terms of GDP growth and, for several decades, in terms of 
dependency ratios, hence on the evolution of pension contribution rates: the flow of migrants 
participate in the financing of the PAYG system.  
This scenario is interesting in relation to the present situation in France for instance: new 
available data on total population (January 2005) have testified for a leap in immigration that 
may contradict the gloomy predictions regarding the presumed unsustainability of the French 
public pension scheme. Would the pension reform enacted in 2003 have come too soon? Or 
has it just been part of the dismantling of the Welfare State that we analyzed in the previous 
Section?  
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c. Higher employment rates in Europe 
As emphasized in the previous  Section, a major ingredient of the so-called “Lisbon 
strategy” is to obtain, through various policies of structural reforms in the European  labor 
markets, an important increase in employment rates. Insofar as labor supplies are exogenous 
and include an evaluation of participation rates in the baseline scenario of the INGENUE 
model, it is quite straightforward to simulate the economic consequences of such a change in 
measured labor market conditions.  
Due to the diagnosis of low employment rates in the EU, the objectives stated in the 
Lisbon strategy were the following: “The European Council considers that the overall aim of 
these measures should be […] to raise the employment rate from an average of 61% today to 
as close as possible to 70% by 2010 and to increase the number of women in employment 
from an average of 51% today to more than 60% by 2010”. Mixing up men and women, as 
well as Western and Eastern European countries, enhancing average participation rates up to 
60% in 2010 yet would be a feat. As shown in table 1, employment rates in 2000 were highly 
diversified across cohorts of the same region, and across regions (or countries).  
 
Table 1. EU Employment rates in 2000 
Cohorts  Poland  Czech Rep.  Hungary  Slovakia  Slovenia 
50-54 yrs.  61.4  80.4  66.4  69.0  64.4 
55-59 yrs.  37.7  50.2  33.7  34.5  29.0 
60-64 yrs.  20.9  16.9  7.6  6.1  15.1 
15-64 yrs.  55.1  64.9  55.9  56.3  62.7 
  Latvia  Estonia  Lithuania    EU-15 
50-54 yrs.  69.9  73.6  72.8    70.0 
55-59 yrs.  49.3  58.4  56.8    51.9 
60-64 yrs.  21.8  29.4  26.4    33.6 
15-64 yrs.  58.2  60.6  60.1    63.2 
Source: European Commission (2003) 
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In this second scenario, we have thus assumed the occurrence of the following situation: 
the employment rate in Western  Europe for the cohort 60-65 yrs. would converge to the 
employment rate for the cohort 55-59 yrs. in 2025 (hence a major shock); in Eastern Europe, 
the scenario would consist of a convergence of employment rates towards the Western 
European levels to end in 2075.
50  
The economic consequences of such an increase in the European  labor force, clearly 
more sustainable than in the migration scenario, are quite large (see Chart 3, a, b, c). Because 
this increase initially depresses the European capital-labor ratio, hence productivity, it has a 
negative impact on GDP per capita, but  since it  also boosts investment, GDP growth 
progressively increases, to reach its highest rate in the EU-15 after employment rates have 
converged within this region, whereas the evolution of economic growth in the Eastern part of 
Europe is lower and reaches its highest point in 2040.  
Because this increase in labor supply is obtained without changing the rules of the public 
pension systems, especially the mandatory retirement age, it does not depress household 
savings, so that the rise in investment is entirely responsible for the deterioration of the 
European current account, while the domestic consequences are clearly  favorable, in 
particular for the evolution of the dependency ratios and that of the pension contribution rates. 
In Western European countries, the major improvement in “old-workers” employment rates 
would permit a substantial reduction in pension contribution rates of about 5 points. 
Improving growth perspectives, while enforcing a recommendation of the Lisbon strategy, 
would thus also permit to substantially reduce the size of compulsory levies in Europe. This 
would certainly be a coherent strategy that would in turn favor private initiative. It is however 
conditional on the ability of European economies to actually increase employment rates and 
decrease mass unemployment.  
d. Fast technological convergence of Eastern Europe 
In this third simulation scenario conducted with the INGENUE model, it is assumed that 
that the parameters of the exogenous law of motion of the Eastern European TFP are set in 
such a way that it catches up quickly on Western Europe: indeed, we have assumed that the 
level of Eastern European TFP reaches that of Western Europe by the end of the century, 
quite an optimistic scenario given the current very large gap.  
Even so, h owever, the evolutions of growth in the  Western  European area are only 
slightly more  favorable than in the baseline scenario, for at least two reasons: one is the 
                                                 
50 Such a convergence towards higher participation rates is likely in the Central and Eastern European 
countries as a consequence to the recent pension systems’ reforms (Dupont, 2004): because pensions are now 
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relative small size of Eastern Europe; the other is the result of a feature of the current version 
of the INGENUE model, in which the specification of trade is such that the consequences of 
improvement in the Eastern European performance are dispersed over the whole world, not 
just its main trade partners.  
The incidence of higher TFP growth in Eastern European countries is more substantial in 
this region: GDP growth rate increases by an average of .8 point after 5 and 10 years and 
remains above the baseline case until 2050 at least. The underlying dynamics is as follows: 
Higher TFP growth induces smaller savings (hence, higher consumption) and net inflows of 
foreign capital: the first effect in turn provokes higher imports that  deteriorate the trade 
balance; whereas the second effect deteriorates the current account balance. In the mid-run, 
the positive impact of the TFP shock on Eastern European economic growth has thus mainly a 
domestic origin. In the longer run, however, higher TFP growth is converted in lower prices 
that boost Eastern European competitiveness. This in turn improves the trade and current 
account balance; the persistence in higher growth, in comparison with the baseline case, has 
now a foreign origin. A virtuous circle would be under way if the scenario took place.  
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Section 4 . General conclusion 
To conclude, we summarize the main outcomes of the Report. 
In the first Section, basing upon different sources in the economic literature, we have 
suggested that technology does not play a major role in explaining output per capita 
differences between the USA, Japan and the European Union (EU). As our own work has 
shown, the measurement of Total Factor Productivity  (TFP)  is very sensitive to the 
assumption of a constant lifespan of equipment, and to a change in the price index used: better 
handling the evolution of quality significantly modifies the computed growth components. It 
has been shown that low employment levels as well as weak investment were the prevailing 
causes of poor European economic growth performance. As such, investment seems to play 
an essential role in the process of determination of potential growth.  Although t echnical 
progress does matter, long-run growth depends more on the way this technical progress has 
been made sustainable thanks to appropriate investment. 
As for labor, it has been shown that the deceleration of EU-15 productivity growth has 
largely  been  due to non-ICT industries, in particular service industries. Whereas US labor 
productivity growth accelerated through higher contributions of all sources of growth, EU-15 
labor productivity growth slow downed because of a decline in contributions from both non-
ICT capital deepening and non-ICT TFP, erasing the increased contribution from ICT-capital 
deepening and TFP growth in ICT producing industries.  
In the second Section, the incidence of institutions on economic performance has been 
documented and an in-depth analysis has been produced. The so-called “Lisbon strategy” has 
been presented; its diagnosis and recommendations have been  precisely analyzed. Main 
outcomes have stemmed from empirical investigations.  
In order to  investigate further  the so-called European “innovation deficit”  that the 
“Lisbon strategy” has diagnosed, we have tested the incidence of higher public investment on 
economic growth in the USA, Japan and the Euro Zone. Although public investment per se 
does not exclusively include the type of “productive expenditures” the “Lisbon strategy” 
recommends performing, our empirical r esults clearly show that public investment has a 
significant and substantial favorable impact on output in the US and the Euro zone, although 
not in Japan. The “Lisbon strategy” in Europe is legitimized by the data. A complementary 
VAR study reveals that a virtuous circle between public investment, private investment and 
growth would be occurring in the Euro zone.  
One can conclude from this empirical study dedicated to the determinants of output and 
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In order to investigate further the so-called European “labor deficit” that the “Lisbon 
strategy” has diagnosed, panel tests have been performed. Harsh robustness checks have been 
implemented and results show that fiscal policies are efficient in reducing unemployment, but 
their efficiency is conditional on the existence of relatively flexible labor institutions. 
Reversing the logic, strong constraints on fiscal policy in the EU, within the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, would appear legitimate only 
insofar as “rigid” labor institutions would be in place. As a conclusion, the  SGP is 
inappropriate if the Welfare State is being dismantled. Hence, a better coordination between 
institutions, or an appropriate “macro-structural” mix, is dramatically needed in the EU. 
Unfortunately, the “European Constitution” has led to a “Frozen Landscape” of the EU 
growth strategy, although it has been shown, in this Report, and elsewhere in the literature, 
that  EU institutions had failed to endorse the “Lisbon strategy”. Despite the recent EU 
enlargement towards ten relatively poor countries, the “Frozen Landscape” consists of  a 
smaller central budget, a stronger fiscal surveillance without reform of the SGP,  and  a 
credibility-focused monetary policy. The growth outcome attached to this perspective is at 
best stable, meaning the pursuit of the dismal decade into the new century.  
In the third Section, we have investigated a more optimistic situation: the “Fulfilled 
Potential”. Using  for the first time the version 2 of the large, overlapping-generations, 
general-equilibrium model of the world economy  the INGENUE model  developed by three 
French economic institutes (CEPII, CEPREMAP, OFCE), we have studied numerically the 
impact on European countries of the EU enlargement and of a successful “Lisbon strategy”. In 
this latter case, it has been assumed that the EU accorded its means to its objectives, rather 
than the opposite. 
The “enlargement scenario” has focused on migration from the Eastern part of Europe to 
its Western part. The economic consequences of this migration scenario have been shown to 
be quite dramatic for the countries of origin, which bear a drop in their working age 
population, hence in potential and economic growth. In Western Europe, the consequences 
would be clearly beneficial, both in terms of GDP growth and, for several decades, in terms of 
dependency ratios, hence on the evolution of pension contribution rates: the flow of migrants 
would participate in the financing of the public pension system.  
The “Lisbon scenario” has focused on  the increase in employment rates the Presidency 
conclusions of the Lisbon European Council had  wished in 2000.  In Western European 
countries, the major improvement in “old-workers” employment rates would permit a 
substantial reduction in pension contribution rates. Improving growth perspectives, while 
enforcing a recommendation of the “Lisbon strategy”, would indeed permit to substantially 
reduce the size of compulsory levies in Europe. This would certainly be a coherent strategy International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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that would in turn favor private initiative. It is however conditional on the ability of European 
economies to actually increase employment rates and decrease mass unemployment, hence on 
their ability to effectively endorse the “Fulfilled Potential” scenario.  
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Section 6 . Appendix 1: Results from VAR estimations  







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of DLNPIB to DLNPIB
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Variance decomposition of economic growth - USA 
           
Period  S.E.  LNIGV  LNIPV  DLNET  DLNPIB 
           
 1   0.034368   15.11395   75.09928   0.192023   9.594750 
 2   0.062777   14.36753   68.55567   8.352935   8.723863 
 3   0.089577   13.19229   67.35806   10.03313   9.416529 
 4   0.111419   12.72759   67.99240   9.899555   9.380453 
 5   0.127187   12.62598   68.25757   9.816482   9.299973 
 6   0.138538   12.74847   68.05288   9.805270   9.393382 
 7   0.146866   12.86917   67.85069   9.770136   9.509998 
 8   0.153237   12.92095   67.72498   9.796539   9.557534 
 9   0.158508   12.92690   67.65723   9.854446   9.561424 
 10   0.163248   12.92054   67.63426   9.888865   9.556336 
           
 Cholesky Ordering: LNIGV LNIPV DLNET DLNPIB 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of DLNPIB to DLNPIB
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Variance decomposition of economic growth – Japan – full sample 
           
Period  S.E.  LNIGV  LNIPV  DLNET  DLNPIB 
           
 1   0.058564   4.028928   86.09031   1.043095   8.837663 
 2   0.084156   6.340345   76.01899   10.43903   7.201632 
 3   0.101729   6.228766   74.02047   11.13091   8.619858 
 4   0.120009   6.014981   70.35084   15.53567   8.098507 
 5   0.134986   6.322067   69.88197   15.69048   8.105479 
 6   0.147446   6.852152   69.43338   15.74976   7.964711 
 7   0.158855   7.573447   68.43540   16.21798   7.773169 
 8   0.167837   8.094429   68.17838   16.03200   7.695186 
 9   0.174796   8.368445   68.33109   15.74495   7.555520 
 10   0.180479   8.520227   68.48645   15.53446   7.458867 
           
 Cholesky Ordering: LNIGV LNIPV DLNET DLNPIB 
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Response of DLNPIB to DLNPIB
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Variance decomposition of economic growth – Japan – short sample 
           
Period  S.E.  LNIGV  LNIPV  DLNET  DLNPIB 
           
 1   0.044110   8.253752   75.17587   0.412667   16.15771 
 2   0.076325   24.40699   48.53524   14.97852   12.07926 
 3   0.093592   21.13481   40.86830   28.13075   9.866128 
 4   0.106296   27.75281   28.97519   31.03493   12.23706 
 5   0.108998   26.68222   25.18096   33.22226   14.91457 
 6   0.113071   20.55464   18.22923   43.65318   17.56295 
 7   0.117495   19.88634   17.43839   45.60866   17.06661 
 8   0.124854   17.85691   17.79893   42.37374   21.97042 
 9   0.139031   16.07080   17.59395   40.24614   26.08910 
 10   0.160542   15.23653   18.86332   39.26626   26.63389 
           
 Cholesky Ordering: LNIGV LNIPV DLNET DLNPIB 
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Response of DLNPIB to DLNPIB
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Variance decomposition of economic growth – Euro zone  
           
Period  S.E.  LNIGV  LNIPV  DLNET  DLNPIB 
           
 1   0.028613   9.177900   49.89313   10.71865   30.21032 
 2   0.046071   15.16064   40.22777   20.20916   24.40242 
 3   0.059295   13.83572   34.99495   29.17205   21.99729 
 4   0.070778   13.39017   36.51200   28.47982   21.61801 
 5   0.080001   13.34144   36.52764   29.03065   21.10027 
 6   0.086300   13.18174   35.70092   30.02056   21.09678 
 7   0.090278   13.10394   35.64871   30.05997   21.18738 
 8   0.093265   13.09243   35.66244   30.06254   21.18260 
 9   0.096255   13.08732   35.66108   30.08801   21.16360 
 10   0.099575   13.10632   35.73362   30.03593   21.12413 
           
 Cholesky Ordering: LNIGV LNIPV DLNET DLNPIB 
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Section 7 .  Appendix 2: Methodology and data for the panel 
estimation of unemployment growth 
A two-step approach has been implemented. Firstly, we expose the robustness tests; and 
secondly, we describe our specifications of unemployment equations. 
Robustness tests investigate the sensitivity of a parameter to different alternative 
specifications. We have used the Extreme Bound Analysis of Leamer (1983) introduced by 
Levine and Renelt (1992) in the literature on growth empirical studies. The test investigates 
the sensitivity of a parameter to different control variables.  
Consider the following equation: 
Y = c + b.M + g.Z + e,                   (A1) 
where M is the variable to test, Z the set of control variables. Equation (A1) is estimated for 
all possible combinations of three variables contained in  Z
51. Then, consider the set of 
estimates of b that are significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level,  b ˆ . For 
each of these estimates, we compute  b ˆ -std( b ˆ ) and  b ˆ +std( b ˆ ) (where std( b ˆ )  is the 
estimated standard error of the estimated coefficient  b ˆ ). The confidence interval is 
constructed as follows: the lower bound is the smallest value of  b ˆ -std( b ˆ ), the higher bound 
is the highest value of  b ˆ +std(b ˆ ). 
We have adopted the following rule: the variable M is said to be robust if two conditions 
are met: (i) it is significant, at the 5% significance level, in more than 0,5% of the cases; (ii) 
the confidence interval does not contain zero. Equation (A1) is estimated by OLS, with no 
fixed effects nor time dummies. The result of this procedure is a list of robust variables, i.e. 
variables that cannot be excluded as potential determinants of unemployment growth for at 
least one of the sub-periods. 
The second step of our analysis has been to estimate unemployment equations for the 
robust variables. Labor force growth is always included, in order to control for the changes in 
this variable
52. Thus we estimate the following equation for each of the robust variable: 
, , ,, .. it it itit ULx qgdh
••
=+++ ,                 (A2) 
where  U
•
 stands for unemployment growth, and  L
•
 for labor force growth, and  x is the 
variable of interest.  
                                                 
51 The number of control variables is restricted to three in order to avoid multicolinearity problems. 
52 The number of unemployed is the difference between labor force and the number of jobs created. Thus, 
there is a relationship between the growth rate of the unemployment rate, the growth rate of the labor force and 
the growth rate of employment. This relationship is non-linear so that the regression of unemployment rate 
growth on labor force growth and employment growth does not yield a perfect fit. International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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We  have  taken somewhat  into account the endogeneity of some variables using 
instrumental variables estimation (two-stage-least squares). For instance, we have considered 
labor force growth as endogenous in order to take into account flexion effects in response to 
unemployment rate changes. The set of instruments was made of the following variables (in 
first difference of log): lagged GDP, lagged public expenditures, participation rate, working 
age population, spread between long and short run interest rates, output gap, percentage of 
employment in public administration, degree of openness, competitiveness, the variation in 
the percentage of women in labor force from 1970 to 1990, schooling rate at 23 years.  
Among these instruments, the participation rate at first sight seems irrelevant, due to its 
endogeneity with unemployment. We contest this endogeneity on grounds of the panel data. 
Using the results of a cross-sectional analysis in the mid-90s, one can verify that countries 
with the same participation rates had very heterogeneous unemployment rates. For instance, 
with a participation rate equal to 77%, unemployment rate was 5.6% of active population in 
the US, 7.7% in Sweden and 9.5% in Canada; with a participation rate close to 65%, 
unemployment rate was 7.1% of active population in the Netherlands and 11.5% in France. 
Such  heterogeneity in work supply behaviors among OECD countries is confirmed in 
difference also. 
The data set covers 12 countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. It covers 20 
years, from 1975 to 1995. We have considered three different sub-periods: 1975-1980, 1981-
1989, 1990-1995, to take into account regime changes in the determinants of unemployment 
growth. The first period is a period of stagflation along which unemployment growth is not as 
steep as it will be in the eighties; the second period illustrates the steep growth in the 
unemployment rates and their stabilization at very high levels; meanwhile, real interest rates 
are raised sharply. At the end of this second period, European countries faced an upheaval: 
namely, German reunification, which had strong consequences on the implementation of 
economic policies and macroeconomic performance. In the early nineties, OECD countries 
therefore face quite different situations: the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United 
States benefit from a recovery; Finland and Sweden are facing a dramatic banking crises and 
the loss of export markets; while the other countries do not show any noteworthy 
improvement in their situation regarding unemployment: most of them (except Belgium) 
suffered even from higher unemployment rate. 
The entire data set includes more than 80 variables, that we organized in six topics: (1) 
general economic structure: labor force size, labor supply structure by sex, employment 
structure by sector, international competition, production structure by sector, inequalities; (2) 
macroeconomic environment: real GDP, output gap, investment, real unit labor costs, real 
wages, inflation rates, long-term interest rates, the spread between the long and short-term International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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interest rates; (3) the role of the state: level and structure of public expenditures, public 
employment, tax structure, income tax, social security expenditures, contributions and deficit, 
human capital proxies and education expenditures; (4) labor market structure: union coverage, 
active labor market policies, job protection, replacement rate; (5) monetary policy, (6) fiscal 
policy.  
Data sources are the OECD, but also the PNUD, the World Bank development indicators, 
and the  Luxembourg Income Studies. The data set involves panel series (most 
macroeconomic series) which capture both the cross-section and time-series dimensions, and 
cross-section series, which capture the cross-section differences only. This is the case for 
labor market structure (union coverage in 1970 and in 1990, variation in the union coverage 
from 1970 to 1990, active labor market policies, employment protection), allocation of public 
expenditures (towards social security, education, housing and health), income tax,  labor 
market structure by sex, production structure by sector (agricultural vs. manufacturing 
products), inequalities, human capital and education.  International Collaboration Project / ESRI Tokyo-NRA  
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Section 8 . Appendix 3: Charts for the simulations performed 
with the INGENUE v.2 model 
Chart 1. Baseline scenario 
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Chart 2. Migrations, or simulating a consequence of the EU enlargement process 
a. GDP Growth rate (2000-2050)
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b. Evolution of Social Security contribution Rate (2000-2050)
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c. Dependency ratio (retirees in percentage of total active population): 
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Chart 3. Higher employment rates in the EU, or simulating the Lisbon strategy 
a. GDP Growth rate (2000-2050)
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b. Evolution of Social Security contribution Rate (2000-2050)
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c. Evolution of Current Balance (percentage of regional GDP) :
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Chart 4. Fast technological convergence of Eastern Europe 
a. GDP Growth rate (2000-2050)
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b. Evolution of Current Balance (percentage of regional GDP) :
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c. Evolution of Trade Balance (percentage of regional GDP) :
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